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Abstract:
	 
 It is estimated that 25% of the remaining oil and gas reserves worldwide are held in 
Arctic regions. The combined effects of a global resource depletion, climate change and 
technological progress, mean that this natural resource area is now increasingly inter-
esting and commercially attractive.  However, numerous challenges are present when it 
comes to hydrocarbon production in cold climate, not only related to suitable technol-
ogy, but also to social and environmental issues. Any hydrocarbon development in the 
Arctic represents, thus, a balance between opportunity and risk.  
This thesis analyzes a broad range of aspects influencing offshore hydrocarbon field 
development scenarios in cold climate, emphasizing on terminals as a major build-
ing block necessary in the development of a petroleum field.
Feasible, safe and cost effective terminal concepts for cold climate areas, face chal-
lenges that need specific assessment of technical solutions and operational aspects. 
Many of these challenges can be managed, though at additional cost,  through the appli-
cation of customised solutions. 
After having presented and gained the necessary knowledge and insight in the main 
issues influencing a cold climate terminal,  an assessment of different development 
schemes is carried out,  using for this purpose three case studies located in the Barents 
Sea: Johan Castberg, Snøhvit and Goliat fields.
In this context, a quantitative assessment of breakwater stability in cold climate envi-
ronments has been an important part of the discussions.
Finally, given the complex and often unique risk challenges present in cold climate 
regions, risk assessment arise as an important part of the decision making process, and 
thus, has been used to understand the sensitivity of different development schemes.
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The Master thesis, therefore, provides an insight in the following aspects:
- Aspects influencing offshore hydrocarbon field development scenarios in cold 
climate.
- Technical issues influencing a cold climate terminal, with a thorough quantita-
tive discussion of breakwater stability and design in cold climate.
- Operational issues influencing a cold climate terminal.
- Assessment of the sensitivity of different schemes through case studies analy-
sis.
- Risk assessment for identification and evaluation of the main risks involved, 
applied to the case studies.
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BACKGROUND
It is estimated that about 25% of the remaining oil and gas reserves worldwide are held 
in Arctic regions. The combined effects of a global resource depletion, climate change 
and technological progress, mean that this natural resource area is now increasingly in-
teresting and commercially attractive. However, any oil and gas development in the Arc-
tic represents a balance between opportunity and risk. The Arctic offers numerous chal-
lenges when it comes to oil and gas production because of the remoteness, darkness, 
cold climate, impairments from ice offshore and permafrost on land. Challenges are not 
only related to suitable technology, but also to social and environmental issues.
TASK DESCRIPTION
This thesis will analyze Offshore Field Developments in Cold Climate, with focus on 
terminals, as a major building block in the development of a petroleum field.
Onshore terminals as part of the oil and gas production process are dedicated harbor fa-
cilities with different functions associated such as: export, import, transshipment, storage 
or processing. The need for processing is essential to obtain the products that can be sold 
and transported.  Other facilities, for instance concrete platforms, production ships or 
offshore storage tanks, can provide terminal functions.  The parameters for an onshore 
terminal choice will be safety, reliability and costs, taking into account aspects such as 
accessibility due to climate aspects, maintenance, future extensions, structural design etc.  
Specific issues are relevant to establish an onshore terminal project in an Arctic region. 
Operational and structural aspects of arctic terminals must be studied in detail and will 
be discussed through case scenarios in this context.
• Technical aspects of terminals
- Pipeline design specific issues
- Breakwater design specific issues 
- Harbour oscillations
• Operational aspects of terminals
- Terminal arrangement
- Ice management
- Spilled oil
- Tanker operations
 Many of these challenges can be managed, though at additional cost, through the 
application of existing technologies, through specific design and build specifications, or 
with adapted processes and additional infrastructure. A justification of investment and 
economical assessment is of great importance to decide over the different options.
 Finally, the given complex and often unique risk challenges of the Arctic, arise 
the specific need for improved knowledge, risk assessment and risk management in the 
Arctic context. Risk analysis and selection of safety levels are an important part of the 
decision making process.
 
 The Master thesis, therefore, will provide an insight in the following aspects:
- Aspects influencing offshore hydrocarbon field development scenarios in cold 
climate.
- Technical issues influencing a cold climate terminal.
- Operational issues influencing a cold climate terminal.
- Assessment of the sensitivity of different schemes through case study analysis.
- Risk analysis for identification and evaluation of the main risks involved
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General about content, work and presentation
The text for the master thesis is meant as a framework for the work of the candi-
date. Adjustments might be done as the work progresses. Tentative changes must 
be done in cooperation and agreement with the professor in charge at the De-
partment.
The reporting of the work should be academic anchored and well described with 
respect to the theoretical and scientific basis so that the work could be imple-
mented in the field of international research.
In the evaluation thoroughness in the work will be emphasized, as will be docu-
mentation of independence in assessments and conclusions. Furthermore the 
presentation (report) should be well organized and edited; providing clear, pre-
cise and orderly descriptions without being unnecessary voluminous.
The report shall include:
• Standard report front page (from DAIM, http://daim.idi.ntnu.no/)
• Title page with abstract and keywords.(template on: http://www.ntnu.no/
bat/skjemabank) 
• Preface
• Summary and acknowledgement. The summary shall include the 
objectives of the work, explain how the work has been conducted, 
present the main results achieved and give the main conclusions of the 
work.
• Table of content including list of figures, tables, enclosures and 
appendices. 
• If useful and applicable a list explaining important terms and 
abbreviations should be included.
• The main text.
• Clear and complete references to material used, both in text and figures/
tables. This also applies for personal and/or oral communication and 
information. 
• Text of the Thesis (these pages) signed by professor in charge as 
Attachment 1..
• The report musts have a complete page numbering.
Advice and guidelines for writing of the report is given in: “Writing Reports” by 
Øivind Arntsen. Additional information on report writing is found in “Råd og 
retningslinjer for rapportskriving ved prosjekt og masteroppgave ved Institutt for 
bygg, anlegg og transport” (In Norwegian).  Both are posted on  
http://www.ntnu.no/bat/skjemabank
Submission procedure
Procedures relating to the submission of the thesis are described in DAIM 
(http://daim.idi.ntnu.no/).
Printing of the thesis is ordered through DAIM directly to Skipnes Printing de-
livering the printed paper to the department office 2-4 days later. The department 
will pay for 3 copies, of which the institute retains two copies. Additional copies 
must be paid for by the candidate.
On submission of the thesis the candidate shall submit a CD with the paper in 
digital form in pdf and Word version, the underlying material (such as data col-
lection) in digital form. Students must submit the submission form (from DAIM) 
where both the Ark-Bibl in SBI and Public Services (Building Safety) of SB II 
has signed the form. The submission form including the appropriate signatures 
must be signed by the department office before the form is delivered Faculty 
Office.
Documentation collected during the work, with support from the Department, 
shall be handed in to the Department together with the report.
According to the current laws and regulations at NTNU, the report is the prop-
erty of NTNU. The report and associated results can only be used following ap-
proval from NTNU (and external cooperation partner if applicable). The De-
partment has the right to make use of the results from the work as if conducted 
by a Department employee, as long as other arrangements are not agreed upon 
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document is found on the NTNU HMS-pages  at 
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Preface
It is estimated that 25% of the remaining oil and gas reserves world-
wide are held in Arctic regions. The combined effects of a global resource
depletion, climate change and technological progress, mean that this
natural resource area is now increasingly interesting and commercially
attractive. However, numerous challenges are present when it comes to
hydrocarbon production in cold climate, not only related to suitable
technology, but also to social and environmental issues. Any hydro-
carbon development in the Arctic represents, thus, a balance between
opportunity and risk.
The present thesis focuses on aspects related to offshore hydrocarbon
field development in cold climate. Emphasis is made on terminals as a
major building block necessary in the development of a petroleum field.
Feasible, safe and cost effective terminal concepts for cold climate areas,
face challenges that need specific assesment of technical solutions and
operational aspects. Many of these challenges can be managed, though
at additional cost, through the application of customised solutions. Fi-
nally, given the complex and often unique risk challenges present in
cold climate regions, risk assessment arise as an important part of the
decision making process.
This thesis is my final work within the Erasmus Mundus Master
Course in Coastal and Marine Engineering and Management (CoMEM),
after two years of studies at the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology (NTNU, Norway), Delft University of Technology (TU
Delft, The Netherlands), and the University of Southampton (United
Kingdom).
The thesis work has been carried out at NTNU during the spring of
2013 under the supervision of professor Ove Tobias Gudmestad.
Trondheim, 17th June 2013
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Chapter1Background
1.1 Oil and Gas Opportunities and Risks in the Arctic
The Arctic has for over two centuries been known to hold oil and gas reserves.
In 1923, a petroleum storage was established in northern Alaska for the United
States (US) Navy [1]. However, commercial activities started more recently, in
the late 1960s in the US and Canadian Arctic and in the early 1980s in both the
Norwegian and Russian Arctic. According to the United States Geological Survey
(USGS) estimations 1, approximately one quarter of the global undiscovered oil and
gas reserves may remain to be found in the Arctic. More specifically, the USGS
estimations are that the Arctic contains: 90 billion oil barrel (bbl), 1,669 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids [2]. Figure 1.1
shows the potential areas of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region.
In the next 25 years, the global consumption of natural gas is expected to
increase by 50%, while the oil consumption is expected to increase at a lower
rate, with a predicted increase of about 20% [3]. The combined effects of a global
resource depletion and growing global energy demand, make sustainable oil and gas
production in the Arctic an important contributor for securing energy supply. In
addition, the key factors that sharpen the interest in this natural resource area are
as given below; these factors being interrelated and reinforcing themselves.
– Feasibility: technological progress makes projects technically and economically
viable.
– Commercial attractiveness: high oil prices, for instance reaching 147US$ per
barrel in the summer of 2008, coupled with fears about not being able to
meet future demands from rising powers such as India, China or Brazil, were
making potential Arctic projects attractive to investors [3].
1The USGS estimates do not include non-conventional hydrocarbons, such as heavy oil and
gas hydrates.
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Figure 1.1: Oil and gas potential in the Arctic. Source: USGS
– Accessibility: improving access to the Arctic region due to climate change and
substantial ice melting, consequently a trend towards more ice-free areas of
the Arctic Ocean and longer ice-free periods.
Although at the present moment there is considerable oil and gas activities in the
Arctic (Canada, US, Norway and Russia), and the resources in these areas already
have been under consideration for over 30 years, the challenging environment of the
Arctic has put a threshold on these developments. Some of the numerous challenges
when it comes to oil and gas production, are due to the extreme climate conditions,
for instance: darkness, low temperatures and ice, polar low pressures, remoteness
and impairments from ice offshore and permafrost on land. Challenges are not only
related to lack of qualified technology, but also to social and environmental issues,
due to the resilience of the Arctic´s ecosystems being weak in terms of response to
risk events, and high political and public sensitivity to a disaster.
The Arctic is therefore a complex risk environment and any hydrocarbon
development in this area, represents a balance between opportunity and risk.
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1.2 The Arctic Region
The Arctic region extends across northern North America, northern Europe and
northern Asia, including eight countries (Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Russia,
US, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland), and the oceans and seas in between:
Barents, Beaufort, Chukchi, East Siberian, Greenland, Kara, Laptev, White Sea
and Bays of Hudson and Baffin) [4], [5]. See Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Topography and bathymetry of the Arctic. Source: GRID-ARENDAL
Several definitions of the Arctic as a region exist, and are all extensively used.
The more simplistic definition, delimits the Arctic by the Arctic Circle (66 ◦33 ′N)
(see Figure 1.3), which marks the southern limit where the sun is above (polar day)
and below (polar night) the horizon for 24 hours at least once a year. However, the
variations in temperature, distribution of water bodies, ice conditions or differences
in permafrost occurrence can give rise to more complex definitions. For instance,
based on temperature, the Arctic is defined as the area to the north of the 10 ℃
July isoterm (see Figure 1.3). This isotherm encloses the Arctic Ocean, Greenland,
Svalbard, most of Iceland and the northern coasts of Russia, Canada and Alaska.
West of Norway, the North Atlantic Current (Gulf Stream) deflects the isotherm
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Figure 1.3: Boundaries of the Arctic for different definitions. Source: GRID-
ARENDAL
northward including therefore only the northernmost parts of Scandinavia [6]. Ice
conditions also vary within the region, and therefore, the following areas and
corresponding characteristics can be distinguished:
– Arctic areas with sea ice
- Freezing water
- Drifting ice
- Icebergs
– Cold temperature areas
- Cold winters
- Sea water freezes on vessels
- Freezing rain
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Figure 1.4: Barents Sea ice conditions. Source: Barents 2020, DNV
1.2.1 The Barents Sea
The Barents Sea is not uniform with respect to ice and meteocean conditions. In
the Barents 2020 project [7], the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea is divided in
8 subareas (Figure 1.4). Conditions are somewhat uniform within each subarea.
Subarea II is generally ice free. I, III, IV, VII and VIII usually have ice every
winter. V and VI are in between. The subareas with uniform ice conditions are the
following:
I Spitsbergen
II Norwegian
III Franz Josef Land
IV Kara
V Novozemelsky
VI Kola
VII Pechora
VIII White Sea

Chapter2Purpose and Extent of the Study
The interest for exploration of cold climate oil and gas resources has undergone a
considerable increase over the last years due to some key factors sharpening the
interest such as an increased demand, technological progress and accessibility. Cold
climate regions, however, represent a complex risk environment for any hydrocarbon
field development. The present thesis analyzes aspects that influence offshore
hydrocarbon field development scenarios in cold climate, emphasizing on terminals
as a major building block necessary in the development of a petroleum field.
Firstly, the need for processing and terminals needs to be identified, and there-
after, the main challenges influencing the development of a safe and cost effective
terminal concept, need to be studied in detail. Some of the technical and operational
issues that will need assessment are related to pipeline design, harbour layout, ice
management, oil spills and tanker operations. Specifically, a thorough discussion of
breakwaters in cold climate environments will be necessary, in which the different
options for breakwater design need to be evaluated, with the inclussion of some
quantitative discussions regarding this issue.
After having presented and gained the necessary knowledge and insight in
the main issues influencing a cold climate terminal, an assessment of different
development schemes will be carried out, using for this purpose three case studies
located in the Barents Sea. Johan Castberg, Snøhvit and Goliat fields will be
studied in detail, describing the field development and background of choice first,
and focussing on the terminal concept afterwards for each development. In this
context, a quantitative assessment of the breakwaters stability and design will be
an important part of the discussions.
Finally, in order to understand the sensitivity of the different development
schemes, and given the complex and often unique risk challenges present in cold
climate regions, arises the need for risk assessment as an important part of the
decision making process.
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Summarizing, the Master thesis will provide an insight in the following aspects:
• Aspects influencing offshore hydrocarbon field development scenarios in cold
climate.
• Technical issues influencing a cold climate terminal, with a thorough quanti-
tative discussion of breakwater stability and design in cold climate.
• Operational issues influencing a cold climate terminal.
• Assessment of the sensitivity of different schemes through a case studies
analysis.
• Risk assessment for identification and evaluation of the main risks involved,
applied to the case studies.
Chapter3Structure of the Report
This thesis is divided into 13 chapters structured within four main parts.
– Part I: INTRODUCTION
This introductory part intends to give a clear formulation of the task, providing
the background for the topic (Chapter 1), the purpose and extent of the study
(Chapter 2), and finally explaining how is the report structured in the present
chapter.
• Chapter 1: Background
• Chapter 2: Purpose and Extent
• Chapter 3: Structure of the report
– Part II: OFFSHORE FIELD DEVELOPMENT IN COLD CLI-
MATE WITH EMPHASIS ON TERMINALS
The second part of the thesis starts discussing the main building blocks for
offshore hydrocarbon field developments (Chapter 4). Emphasis is made
on the terminals, and thus, Chapters 5 and 6 will give an insight into the
needs for processing and terminals, including the main transport schemes.
In addition, this second part of the thesis deals with the specific challenges
regarding offshore field development in cold climate regions (Chapter 7), with
special attention to oil spills in cold climate (Chapter 8). Finally, chapters
9 and 10 focus on specific technical and operational issues regarding cold
climate terminals.
• Chapter 4: Field Development Building Blocks
• Chapter 5: Needs for Processing and Transport Schemes
• Chapter 6: Needs for Oil and Gas Onshore Terminals
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• Chapter 7: Arctic Specific Issues
• Chapter 8: Oil Spills in Cold Climate
• Chapter 9: Technical aspects for pipelines and harbours
• Chapter 10: Operational aspects of terminals
– Part III: CASE STUDIES
The third part of the thesis discusses three different development schemes in
the Barents Sea: Johan Castberg, Snøhvit and Goliat. Chapter 11 presents
the field developments, discusses the background for the chosen solution, and
goes into the detail of the terminal for each case. Chapter 12 discusses and
applies risk analysis tools to the three case studies in order to identify and
evaluate the main risks involved.
• Chapter 11: Three Fields, Three Solutions
• Chapter 12: Risk Assessment
– Part IV: CONCLUSIONS
The final chapter of the thesis presents and outlook of the work carried out,
and some concluding remarks.
• Chapter 13: Concluding Remarks
Part II
Offshore Field Development in
Cold Climate with Emphasis on
Terminals
13

Chapter4Offshore Field DevelopmentBuilding Blocks
The development of an offshore hydrocarbon field, is a complex project which
includes many kinds of equipment and installations in order to cover all the required
functions of oil and gas production.
A number of issues need to be addressed, such as:
– gathering the well stream
– where and how to treat produced fluids
– how to transport and store products once processed
For addressing these issues, most developments can be broken down into different
building blocks. The main building blocks used in the development of a petroleum
field, can be classified as follows:
– Wells
. Wellhead platform
. Subsea equipment: templates, manifolds and flowlines
– Offshore production facilities
. Production platform: fixed or floating
. Risers
– Transportation systems
. Pipelines
. Tankers
– Onshore processing
. Terminals
. Refineries
15
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The offshore field development layout will vary depending on the well pattern and
the export product specifications [8], and in most cases, will involve the combination
of several building blocks. Some of the typical field layouts might include:
– wellhead, process and quarters adjacent platforms
– integrated production platform
– floating production system
– subsea production system: connecting to a fixed platform, to a floating plat-
form, to a ship unit or directly to an onshore facility.
Several examples of different field layout scenarios can be given from the Norwegian
Continental Shelf. Figure 4.1 shows an example of a field development layout in
the Norwegian Sea. In that case, the Norne field has been developed through a
production and storage ship tied to subsea tempates. The ship has a processing
plant on deck and storage tanks for stabilised oil, and flexible risers carry the
wellstream to the ship, which is able to rotate around a turret moored to the seabed
to head up against the wave direction [9].
Figure 4.1: Norne field development. Source: Statoil
Although the different developments tend to be characterised by the production
facility used, the design of the project usually starts taking into consideration the
processing required to handle the reservoir wellstream [10]. The different processing
requirements for a production facility, need to be studied in detail for an optimum
design. Usually, due to the large costs of offshore processing, only minimum
processing is carried out offshore, for instance removal of water, separation of oil
and gas, and oil stabilization. The final processing is, in most cases, carried out at
an onshore terminal [11].
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In addition, the transportation system as a building block, can involve offshore
loading of stable oil to tankers, oil transport by pipeline to shore and/or gas export
pipelines.
Offshore topside and subsea facilities will be further discussed in this chapter,
while the need for processing and onshore terminals in addition to transport schemes
will be studied in detail on chapters 5 and 6.
4.1 Topside
Offshore platforms can be classified a grosso modo in two categories: fixed and
floating installations. The selection of the suitable platform type (if any) is mainly
based on the water depth and the number of wells.
4.1.1 Fixed platforms
Fixed platforms (Figure 4.2) can be further classified in:
– Steel jacket platform
– Gravity-based platform
Figure 4.2: Fixed production platforms. Source: F. Jahn et al., 2008
The steel piled jacket type of platform is a well-established technology, probably
the most common. It is used as a wellhead platform with no storage for limited
water depths up to 150m, and in a broad range of sea conditions [10]. Built from
welded steel pipes, the platform is constructed onshore and then floated out on a
barge to the corresponding offshore location. In addition, offshore installation of
topsides for processing equipment, drilling, living quarters etc., is required.
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Concrete or steel gravity-based platforms are used for similar water depths as the
steel piled jacket type. The main advantage in this case is that the need for piling
in hard seabeds is eliminated since they rely on their own weight. The concrete
type is the most common, and it offers the possibility of temporary oil storage on
their hollow concrete legs [10]. The use of a barge is not necessary for floating the
platform out, furthermore on-shore installation of topsides is possible.
The Oseberg Field in the North Sea (Figure 4.3), provides an example of a
development which includes both types of fixed platforms with different functions.
Three platforms (Oseberg A, B and D) are located in the south part of the field,
connected by bridges, in addition to a fourth platform (Oseberg C) lying 14 km
north of the field centre. Oseberg A is a concrete base platform with process
equipment, oil storage and living quarters, while Oseberg B is a steel jacket which
has drilling, production and injection equipment. Oseberg D is a steel platform
with gas processing and export equipment. Finally, Oseberg C is an integrated
drilling, accommodation and production unit on a steel jacket [9].
Figure 4.3: Concrete based and steel jacket platforms in the Oseberg field in the
North Sea. Source: Statoil
4.1.2 Floating platforms
Floating platforms (Figure 4.4) can be categorised into the following types:
– Tension Leg Platform (TLP)
– Semi-submersible units
– Floating Production, Storage and Oﬄoading (FPSO)
– Spar platforms
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Figure 4.4: Floating production platforms. Source: F. Jahn et al., 2008
Floating platforms are common in deep water fields where a fixed platform
scheme is not technically or economically feasible, or in the case of small fields for
which the cost of a fixed system is not justified.
TLP are suitable for deep water, and although this is a well-know technology,
their dynamic behaviour is complex [8]. A TLP rig is tied to the bottom through
jointed legs kept in tension. Oil storage is not possible.
The semi submersible concept is also suitable for deep water and can include
a drilling rig or subsea wells. The new build semi submersible platforms have
been designed for an increased topside weight in order to accommodate production
facilities, and to support heavy steel risers [10]. This concept is moored with
additional mooring lines and anchors.
Ship-shaped units are mainly FPSOs vessels with some variants, for instance
a Floating Production, Storage, Drilling and Oﬄoading (FPSDO) or a Floating
Storage Unit (FSU). This concept includes subsea wells and flexible risers from
the sea bottom to the floating unit. Complex mooring systems and connection to
the wellheads are required to accommodate rotation and movement towards the
direction of the wind and currents (weathervaning).
The first Spar platforms were developed for offshore loading and as oil storage
facilities, for instance in the Brent Field in the North Sea [10]. More recent concepts
incorporate drilling and some production, although the deck area is limited. The
complex dynamic behavior is significant if large currents are present [8].
The Snorre field (Figure 4.5) in the Norwegian North Sea, is an example of
a field in which two of these concepts are employed. Snorre A as an integrated
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production, drilling and quarters unit consisting of a TLP moored to the sea bottom
by steel tethers; and Snorre B, a semi submersible platform located about 7 km
north of the A platform.
Figure 4.5: Semi-submersible platform at Snorre field in the North Sea. Source:
Oil Rig Photos
4.2 Subsea
Subsea production systems are an alternative option for development of an offshore
field.
These production systems operated on the seabed, represent a cost-effective
solution for the development of small size reservoirs, which otherwise alone do not
justify a complete development including a platform. In this case, subsea systems
can be conected directly to a nearby existing production platform which is not close
enough to allow wells to be drilled from the platform directly.
The use of subsea systems for deeper waters, can also lead to lower costs of the
developments. In this case, a possible solution is their use in combination with a
floating production system such as a production ship. Subsea-to-shore is another
solution which conects directly the subsea wells with an onshore processing facility
or terminal.
The main components of a subsea system are the well and the production and
pipeline systems. The basic installation is a single subsea wellhead with subsea tree1
connected to the corresponding production facility by pipelines and umbilicals2.
1Subsea tree: assembly of valves and gauges located at the top of the well.
2Umbilicals may consist of control electric, hydraulic or optical cables, and chemical lines for
injection of fluids into the well.
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Figure 4.6: Subsea template with four wells tied to the fixed platform at Gullfaks
C in the Norwegian North Sea. Source: Statoil
Another configuration is a subsea production template (Figure 4.6), where several
wells are drilled at a certain location. The wells are located directly below the
tubular structure, allowing drilling and completion from a single location. The third
component is a manifold, which is a tubular structure similar to a template. The
different subsea trees installed on the seabed are tied back to the central manifold
through flow lines and umbilicals. A single set of pipelines and umbilicals is then
required to connect the manifold with the production facility.
Ormen Lange field, in the Norwegian Sea, is an example of an offshore field
development in which the full wellstream is transferred directly to an onshore facility
(Nyhamna) for processing and exporting of gas, with no need of topside installations
(Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7: Subsea development at Ormen Lange field. Source: Subsea World
News
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4.3 Building Blocks for Arctic Developments
Specific considerations need to be taken when treating offshore exploration of oil
and gas fields in the Arctic. The main issues influencing an Arctic field development
will be addressed in Chapter 7. However, this section will present some cases in
which, under Arctic conditions, different solutions have been used for each of the
main building blocks already presented in this chapter.
Production Facilities
Physical environmental conditions (metereological and marine) and site specific
conditions (soil, geotechnical, bathymetric, permafrost etc.) in addition to the
wave and ice actions on the selected platform to be placed at the location, are key
parameters in order to develop a safe design. In the Arctic, the uncertainties in the
estimate of the design ice conditions are specially large. Moreover, the uncertainties
in the ice properties are also important when determining the ice actions [12].
Subsea installations in Arctic conditions present challenges related to the use of
the facilities under ice covered waters. Regarding drilling and maintenance of the
wells, specific technology to avoid the ice is required. In addition, the possibility
of ice interaction with the templates in shallow water is another concern. Ice
strengthened steel templates and trenching of pipelines are required. Moreover, the
well stream flow in Arctic pipelines represents an extra challenge, due to the more
probable hydrate formation 3 at low temperatures [11].
Two examples of production facilities in the Arctic are presented here:
– The Prirazlomnoye field located on the Pechora Sea shelf in nothern Russia, is
at 60km from the shore, at a water depth of about 20m. This field development
is designed with a single gravity based platform in the center of the field. The
Prirazlomnoye platform (Figure 4.8) is an Arctic ice-resistant oil-producing
platform. Well drilling, oil production, storage and oﬄoading are planned
to be carried out4. Its main features are resistance to strong ice loads and
year-round operability.
– The White Rose field (Figure 4.9) is located on the Grand Banks, Canada, in
water depths of around 120m. The field has been developed using a FPSO
vessel. The subsea wells are located in excavated glory holes5 to protect the
subsea equipment from possible iceberg scour. The subsea wells are connected
3See section 5.4.1 for more details
4Start up of the production is delayed (as per June 2013) due to problems with topsides
commissioning.
5Protection measure for subsea equipment. The top of the equipment has a minimum clearance
of 2 to 3m below the seabed level. This is due to the measured scour depths in the area of 1m.
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Figure 4.8: Prirazlomnoye Arctic ice-resistant platform. Source: Gazprom
through flexible flow lines and risers to the ship-shaped floating facility. The
FPSO’s turret system is designed to allow the facility to disconnect from
the subsea installations and move in the event of an emergency such as an
approaching iceberg.
Figure 4.9: White Rose field development on the Grand Banks, Canada. Source:
Husky Energy
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Onshore Processing and Transport Schemes
Hydrocarbon transport from Arctic offshore fields entails large challenges,
whether pipeline or ship transport is selected. In addition, the very long dis-
tances to the oil and gas markets, are translated into substantial capital and
operational costs [12].
Establishing an onshore terminal in an Arctic region involves operational and
technical challenges that will usually involve a comprehensive economical and risk
assessment. The feasibility of this type of project and associated issues, will be the
focus of this thesis report from Chapter 9.
A good example of an Arctic innovative project involving subsea installations,
wellstream, pipeline transport and an Arctic terminal, is Snøhvit (Figure 4.10).
This is the first offshore development in the Barents Sea and presents no surface
installations. The full wellstream is transported directly to the processing plant on
the Melkøya island, using a 143km long pipeline. The transport of the unprocessed
wellstream, through a long seabed pipeline like that, presents several challenges
itself. Due to the high pressure and the low temperature on the seabed, ice plugs
(hydrates) will tend to form in the pipeline. This is avoided by adding Mono
Ethylen Glycol (MEG) at the wellheads, or by heating up the pipeline electrically
as required [9].
Other Arctic considerations for the offshore subsea facilities and the onshore plant
are very important, with aspects such as sudden changes in weather conditions due
to the Polar Low Pressures, icing of equipment and facilities, working environment
under low temperatures, safe ship transportation of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)
to the market or offshore maintenance as some of the main issues. In addition,
special measures need to be taken in order to limit discharges to the sensitive Arctic
environment.
Figure 4.10: Snøhvit field layout in the Barents Sea. Source: Statoil
Chapter5Needs for Processing andTransport Schemes
Processing is a key part of a hydrocarbon development. The wellstream from a
reservoir is normally not suitable for transport or marketing. Processing of the
wellstream is necessary to obtain products that can be transferred to land for further
processing and to obtain commercially suitable products (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Need for processing.
The ultimate purpose of the required processing is the transformation of the
well flow into marketable products with the required qualities before the delivery
to customers is carried out. However, another important determinant of the need
for processing, is to generate products that can be transported and/or stored. For
instance, to be able to transport oil or condensate by ships, these must be stabilised1,
which leads to the removal of the water and most of the gas components from the
crude oil [8]. Another transport processing requirement, has to do with the fact that
1See Section 5.2.2
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non processed oil or gas transported by pipeline to shore, might lead to hydrate
formation, which could cause partial or complete plugging of the pipeline. In this
case, the use of chemicals or heat is necessary to avoid it.
The needs for processing as a key part of a field development, and the main
transport schemes will be addressed in this chapter.
5.1 Well Stream
The needs for processing of the wellstream will vary depending on several factors
regarding the composition of the wellstream and its properties. Therefore, the
knowledge of the basic physical and chemical properties of the wellstream is essential
for the design of the process facilities and moreover to determine the sales products
that can be obtained.
The wellstream is a complex mixture of organic compounds, mostly hydrocarbons
(molecules composed of hydrogen and carbon atoms), some water and may also
include sulphur, nitrogen, oxygen, sand and metal compounds. Typically the
carbon element represents around 85%, the hydrogen element 11-14% and the
other elements usually less than 1%. The non-hydrocarbon components are small
in volume percent, but of particular importance, especially if H2S or CO2 are
present. Their influence on the quality and the processing requirements is notable,
for instance causing corrosion in combination with free water, in addition to the
toxicity.
Wellstream fluids are very diverse, varying from gases, to clear or almost solid
liquids (Extra Heavy Crude). The different types of wellstream can then be classified
depending on the fluid composition, but also using easily measurable properties in
the field, such as:
– Oil gravity: usually expressed in degrees API 2
– Gas to Oil Ratio (GOR): volumetric ratio of the gas/oil produced at standard
conditions of temperature and pressure (25℃, 1 atm).
Table 5.1 shows the main types in which the wellstream can be classified, taking
into account its oil gravity and gas to oil ratio [10].
2American Petroleum Institute (API).
API = 141.5/γ − 131.5
where γ is the specific gravity of the oil with respect to water
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Table 5.1: Types of reservoir fluid
Dry Wet Gas Volatile Black
Gas Gas Condensate Oil Oil
Degrees API - 60-70 50-70 40-50 <40
GOR (Sm3/Sm3) No liquids >15000 3000-15000 2500-3000 100-2500
Wellstreams with different gas to oil ratio will have different needs in terms
of processing. High GOR oil, for instance, will need large processing facilities to
stabilize the oil. As the API number, expressed as degrees API, goes up, the less
dense (lighter and thiner) is the crude. The different density will influence, for
instance, the production of refined products. The water content can also influence
the type of processing required for the wellstream. In these cases, gas drying is
needed, and if the amount of water to handle is large, special facilities for this
purpose may be needed. As it was mentioned before, it is of great importance to
identify the presence of H2S, CO2 and radioactive or corrosive substances as early
as possible, to enable the appropriate choice of processing facilities and the selection
of materials [8].
The composition of the wellstream (hydrocarbon, acid gas, other contaminants
or water content) and its properties (particularly the GOR, oil density and fluid
viscosity) will determine the basis for the design of the process facilities. Therefore,
accurate measurements of flow and compositional data are required in order to
determine the initial volumes of fluid and the flow properties, at an early stage of
the development.
5.2 Processing of Oil and Gas
As it was pointed out in the introduction of the chapter, the wellstream from a
reservoir is normally not suitable for transport or marketing. Usually the well stream
consists of a full range of hydrocarbons from gas (methane, butane, propane, etc.),
condensates (medium density hydrocarbons) to crude oil. In addition, components
such as water, carbon dioxide, sulfur or sand are usually present. Processing of
oil and gas, therefore, comprises a number of complex procedures and facilities to
obtain products suitable for transport and sales. The main processes are outlined
in Figure 5.2.
5.2.1 Separation
As described before, the well stream consists of gas, oil, water and various contami-
nants. The function of the separators is to split the flow into the desirable fractions.
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Figure 5.2: Processing schematic diagram. Modified from F. Jahn et al., 2008
Figure 5.3: Three phase separator. Source: F. Jahn et al., 2008
Separation might be carried out at a single or multiple stage separator. Usually
multistage separation at different pressures is employed to achieve maximum liquid
recovery. The retention period is typically 5 minutes to allow the gas to bubble
out, water to settle at the bottom and oil to be extracted in the middle [13]. An
example of a basic three-phase separator is shown in Figure 5.3.
5.2.2 Oil stabilization and water handling
Even after separation, the oil/condensate still contains gas and water. Crude oil or
condensate needs to be stabilised to minimise gas evolution during transportation by
tanker. This process generates stable liquids with a vapour pressure lower than 0.8
bar at ambient temperature by removing the volatile components, usually through
a fractionation column [8].
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Figure 5.4: Natural gas composition and terminology. Source: F. Jahn et al.,
2008
Usually a large amount of water with different chemical compositions is produced
from petroleum production. The separated water from the wellstream can be
reinjected into the reservoir or treated. Water treatment systems before disposal to
sea are required to meet the corresponding environmental regulations. Standars
range between 10 and 100 parts per million (ppm) of oil in water. In most regulations,
40ppm of oil in water is the legal requirement [10].
5.2.3 Gas processing
Natural gas processing consists of separating all of the various hydrocarbons and
fluids from the natural gas (Figure 5.4), to produce dry natural gas with the required
transport and sales specifications. Sales gas (dry gas), mainly consists of methane
(CH4), but also contains other hydrocarbons such as ethane, butane and propane.
Gas processing comprises, therefore, several stages. Firstly, to prepare gas prior
to transportation by pipeline, it is necessary to extract or inhibit any component
which could cause corrosion or blockage (water vapour, heavy hydrocarbons and
contaminants such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulphide). Before delivery to the
users, further processing is carried out, usually Natural Gas Liquid (NGL) recovery,
compression and possibly liquefaction of natural gas (LNG) or propane and butane
(Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG)) for easier storage and transport.
– Acid gas removal
The main acid gases in produced gas are carbon dioxide (CO2) and hydrogen
sulphide (H2S). The acid gas removal is needed mainly due to corrosion and
toxicity (H2S). Removal can be carried out by absorption, adsorption or gas
permeation [8].
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– Gas dehydratation
In case the gas contains water vapour, it might be necessary to dry it (de-
hydratation). Water condensation could lead to hydrate formation, causing
blockage of the pipeline or process equipment. Dehydratation can be per-
formed by several methods: cooling, absorption or adsorption. Absorption
using solvent tetraethylene glycol (TEG) is the most common method [10].
– NGLs recovery
Once natural gas has been separated from crude oil (in case this is present), it
usually contains other hydrocarbons, mainly ethane (C2H6), propane (C3H8),
butane (C4H10), and pentanes. These are known as NGLs. These are usually
recovered by a fractionation plant, in which the stream passes through a series
of distillation columns called de-ethaniser, de-propaniser and de-butaniser, to
extract ethane, propane and butane respectively and leave a residual stream
of pentane and higher hydrocarbons [10].
– Compression
Gas from a pure natural gas wellhead, may have enough pressure to enter
directly a pipeline transport system. However, gas from separators usually
loose so much pressure that it must be recompressed for transportation [13].
There are several types of compressors used, the main types the reciprocating
and centrifugal compressors. Compression facilities are generally the most
expensive in the gas process faciliy [10].
– Liquefaction of gases
Liquefaction of gases may be carried out for easier transport or storage. For
instance, if the distance to the user is very large, gas might be shipped as
a liquid. Natural dry gas is liquefied (LNG) by refrigeration at -162 ℃ at
atmospheric pressure. The volume is reduced to 1/600th of the original volume
by this process. In a receiving terminal, the LNG is unloaded and can be
converted back to gaseous phase before distribution to users.
Propane and butane are relatively heavy gases which can be also liquefied for
transportation and storage purposes. The liquefied mixture is called LPG, and
is usually liquefied by refrigeration at a temperature of -50℃ and atmospheric
pressure. It can also be liquefied by pressurization at ambient temperature.
Figure 5.5 shows the relation between temperature and minimum pressure
required to liquefy different gases.
5.3 Sales products
As a summary, Table 5.2 presents an overview of the different trade products, their
composition and primary use in the market.
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Figure 5.5: Temperature-vapour pressure relationship of different gases. Source:
H. Ligperingen, 2009
Table 5.2: Products from oil and gas production
Type of Product Description Main use
Crude oil and Complex mixture of hydrocarbon Converted to refined
condensate molecules in different products in oil
combination/concentration refineries
Refined Gasoline, gasoil, naphtha, Mainly transportation
products kerosene, jet fuel, asphalt, etc. and industrial sector
Natural Gas Ethane (C2H6), propane (C3H8) Transportation,
Liquids (NGLs) and butane (C4H10) residential, industrial
LPG (Liquefied butane and propane and commertial sectors
by refrigeration (-50 ℃) or pressure)
Natural Gas Industrial purposes,
Dry gas Mainly methane (CH4), but with residential heating and
limited quantities of heavier gases cooking, electricity
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas by refrigeration generation at a
at -162 ℃. Mainly methane (CH4) gas power plant
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5.4 Transport Schemes
Once oil and gas have been processed to obtain commertially suitable products, these
need to be transported to the users. The main transport methods are pipelines and
ships. Distance, volume, product specification and the capacity of the processing
facility are some of the parameters determining the transport scheme.
The transport method usually varies depending on the nature of the products.
Table 5.3 summarizes the different trading products and their corresponding method
of transport.
Table 5.3: Types of products and transport schemes
Type of Product Transport Scheme
Crude oil and Stable Oil tanker
condensates Non-stable Pipeline
Refined products Gasoline, gasoil, Product tanker
naphtha, kerosene, etc.
Natural Gas Liquids Ethane, LPG Liquid gas carrier
(NGLs)
Natural Gas Dry gas Pipeline
LNG Liquid gas carrier
In terms of distances and volumes, the most common solution for natural gas
is pipeline transport, whereas oil transportation varies between pipeline or ship,
noticing that only stable oil can be transported on ships due to safety reasons.
90% of the natural gas is transported by pipeline, although ship transportation of
natural gas as liquefied gas (LNG) is increasingly used, especially for long distances,
where pipeline construction is not economically or technically feasible. Pipeline
transport for more than 2000km is not a common solution [8], except in the absence
of suitable maritime access. Pipeline transport is therefore favoured over ships as
an export solution in case of smaller distances to the market or large volumes.
Therefore, different parameters (distance, volume, product specification and
capacity of the processing facility), determine the costs of the different transport
schemes, making pipeline or ship transport the most suitable method in each case.
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5.4.1 Pipeline transport
Oil and gas transport through pipelines has several advantages as well as disad-
vantages. The main advantages of oil and gas pipelines as a transport scheme are
[8]:
– Small operation and maintenance costs: although large capital investments
are required, the costs afterwards are relatively low.
– Long lifetime: usually over 50 years if the conditions are optimal.
The main disadvantage is the lack of flexibility; when installed, there is little margin
for modification.
The pipeline system on the Norwegian continental shelf is the largest of its kind
in the world. It comprises 8100km of oil and gas pipelines connecting fields with
processing facilities on the Norwegian coast along with connexion points in France,
Germany, Belgium and UK. Figure 5.6 shows the existing and projected oil and gas
pipelines for Norwegian exports to Europe.
Figure 5.6: Existing and projected pipelines on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
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The pipeline design requirements, will be determined by the product specification,
the flow rates and the pressure conditions. For gas pipelines, for instance, a high
content of CO2 and elevated temperatures may corrode carbon steel, necessitating
the use of a corrosion inhibitor to protect the carbon steel or the use of corrosion-
resistant steel. For oil pipelines, for instance, very viscous oils may need upstream
processing or some treatment along the pipeline such as heating, pigging or special
insulation. In addition, a multiphase flow will require measures to avoid hydrates3.
In pipelines carrying gas with large contents of condensate and NGLs, pressure
must be managed to prevent separation of the liquids from the gas. The pressure
accepted at the receiving terminal is also of importance [11].
5.4.2 Maritime transport
Ship transportation is competitive for very long distances where pipeline construction
is not economically feasible. In addition, an important advantage is its flexibility
when compared to pipeline transport, as most oil and gas tankers are able to call
at almost any port or refinery around the world [8].
The type of liquid bulk carrier used, depends on the product being carried.
Table 5.4 gives an overview of the different liquid bulk carrier types depending on
the product handled [14].
Table 5.4: Liquid bulk carrier types
Type of Type of Capacity range Length Fully loaded
Product bulk carrier (1000 dwt) LOA (m) draught (m)
Crude oil Crude oil tanker 20-400 175-380 9.2-24
Refined products Product tanker 3-50 90-210 6-12.6
LNG LNG gas carrier 60-90 202-245 11.8-12.7
LPG LPG gas carrier 0.5-70 138-220 7-11.5
i Oil tankers
There are several types of crude oil tankers (Figure 5.7) from the Panamax
tanker between 50 and 80 dwt of capacity to the Ultra Large Crude Carrier
(ULCC) of up to 550000 dwt. Even if the size of the tankers has seen an
important increase through the years, nowadays the intermediate size tanker
(50 to 200 kdwt) has become more important since bigger tankers can only
call at few ports in the world due to their deep draught (i.e. up to 24m) [14].
3Hydrates may be generated when hydrocarbon molecules are in contact with water at high
pressures and temperatures below 15-25℃
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Figure 5.7: VLCC "Alexander The Great", 297456 dwt. Source: Capital Ship
Management
ii Liquid gas carriers (see Figure 5.8)
The gas is transported at high pressure or at low temperature. The products
involved include:
– LPG: mixture of propane and butane
– LNG: maily consisting of methane
– Other liquefied gases: amonia, ethylene etc.
The gas is mostly transported at atmospheric pressure and refrigerated (LPG:
-50℃; LNG: -162℃) in liquid form. Some small LPG tankers carry the
gas pressurised (at about 7bar). It is not possible to liquefy the LNG by
pressurisation at temperatures above -80 ℃. In addition, it is not possible to
carry pressurised LPG in big vessels, since it would require too thick walls
for the tanks. The biggest advantage is that the volume of the liquid form of
natural gas is reduced to 1/600 of its original gas volume.
Figure 5.8: LNG gas carrier "Golar Mazo", 76210 dwt. Source: LNG World News

Chapter6Needs for Oil and Gas OnshoreTerminals
Oil and gas onshore terminals (Figure 6.1), are dedicated harbour facilities with
different functions such as: export, import, transshipment, storage and processing
of oil and/or gas. The reasons why these terminals are dedicated, and therefore
separated from other port facilities, have to do with:
– Safety aspects
– Security aspects
– Size of the ships
– Special layout for the quays
– The land facilities are restricted areas
Figure 6.1: Kårstø gas terminal, Norway. Source: Offshore Energy Today
37
38 OFFSHORE FIELD DEVELOPMENT IN COLD CLIMATE
6.1 Onshore versus Offshore Terminals
There are several activities carried out at an onshore terminal. The main function
of the terminals is to receive the incoming oil or gas, in some cases process it,
and make it ready for export into pipelines, by ships or to refineries. As it has
been reviewed in the previous chapter, the processing requirements of an onshore
terminal are characterised by whether they are handling oil, gas or both.
Some of the activities carried out at an onshore terminal, could be accomplished
on offshore facilities such as concrete platforms, production ships or offshore storage
tanks [8]; including loading and shipment of oil and gas.
The most important parameters for the choice between an onshore or offshore
scheme are:
– Costs
The cost assessment needs to take into account the following aspects:
. Accessibility due to waves, wind, currents, ice, visibility etc.
. Maintenance (e.g. dredging)
. Future extensions (if expected)
– Safety
– Reliability
In terms of loading and storage, different marine facilities can be distinguished
[14, 15]:
i Conventional sheltered port with storage and/or processing areas (onshore
terminal).
The berthing area usually consists of a jetty, a loading platform, breasting and
mooring dolphins, and the corresponding breast and spring lines [16]. The
most typical berth arrangement, following the Oil Companies International
Marine Forum (OCIFM) Guidelines [17], is shown in Figure 6.2.
If the harbour is located in an exposed area, it needs to be protected by
breakwaters; their dimensions and location depends on the depth and the
local wave and ice conditions in the harbour area. (More about breakwater
design in Chapter 9).
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Figure 6.2: Typical berthing arrangement for tankers. Source: Thoresen, 2010
ii Single Buoy Mooring
The system consists of a Single Point Mooring (SPM) with submarine pipelines
to shore where storage takes place. In some situations, it may be economically
attractive to carry out the unloading at an offshore single point mooring (see
Figure 6.3), for instance in the case of large ships and insufficient water depth
near the shore, in order to avoid excesive dredging of an approaching channel
and basin, or the construction of a jetty for big tankers.
Figure 6.3: Single buoy mooring. Source: BMT Scientific Marine Services
For the feasibility of this option, waves and currents are decisive parameters.
Table 6.1 shows the limiting wave heights for jetties and SBMs [14].
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Table 6.1: Limiting significant wave heights for jetties and SBMs
During berthing During berthing During loading
without swell (m) with swell (m) or discharging (m)
Jetty 1.5-2.0 1.0-1.5 2.0-3.0
SBM 2.0-3.0 2.0-3.0 4.0-6.0
Winds and currents have also a large influence. Berthing with wind speeds
higher than 12.5m/s to 15m/s is not allowed due to safety reasons. The
advantages of this SBM configuration are the low capital costs, flexibility (for
instance in case of replacement), and high operability (up to Hs = 2− 3m).
The main disadvantages have to do with high operational and maintenance
costs and low pump capacity. It is therefore economical for small to medium
throughputs (up to 5-6 million tons per year) or at very deep water. For
bigger throughputs, this solution becomes less attractive due to the lower
unloading rate when compared with a jetty on an onshore terminal, bigger
delays and greater threat of pollution [14].
iii Offshore terminals with floating storage
This scheme can be economically attractive when dealing with small or remote
fields. It consists of a SBM with a permanently moored storage vessel, which
supplies tankers (see Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4: The Peregrino FPSO. Source: Statoil
In general, loading and unloading of liquified gases, is mostly done at protected
harbours. Some exceptions are for instance, a floating LPG import facility in
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Lebanon and an offshore LNG loading terminal in Brunei [14].
Apart from the loading/unloading activity, one of the most important functions
and, as it was shown in the previous chapter, essential part of the development, is
processing. The costs of an offshore processing are usually very high due to the
installations and offshore work needed. Weight and space restrictions make offshore
processing and storage non-viable in the majority of the situations [10].
Summarizing, some of the terminal functions (loading and small storage), under
specific situations, can be feasible and economically more attractive to carry out
offshore. However, in the majority of cases, the final processing of the product is
carried out at an onshore terminal. The costs of offshore processing are usually
very high, that is why normally, only minimum processing is performed offshore
in order to get products that can be transported onshore for final processing and
larger storage.
An onshore terminal is therefore a major buliding block necessary in the devel-
opment of a hydrocarbon field.
6.2 Types and Functions of Onshore Terminals
The shape, dimensions, location and arrangement of terminals depends on their
function. The functional classification of onshore terminals can be summarized as:
– Export/Import terminal
– Storage and transhipment terminal
– Processing plant
– Industrial terminal (refinery/power plant)
In the majority of the situations, a combination of different functions takes place.
For instance, the facility comprises an oil terminal associated with a refinery or the
facility includes some type of processing, storage and transhipment.
The variety of products handled needs to be taken into account. Simulation
models establish the requirements for berths, loading/unloading and storage capac-
ity.
6.2.1 Onshore facilities in Norway
The Norwegian coast offers good examples of different types of terminals related to
oil and gas production in which different activities are carried out (Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.5: Onshore facilities on the Norwegian coast.
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Table 6.2 1 shows the main onshore terminals on the Norwegian coastline, their
location and main purpose. A variety of functions are involved, for instance receiving
and exporting harbours, refinery, as well as different treatment and storage plants.
Table 6.2: Main onshore oil and gas facilities on the Norwegian coastline
Onshore facility Location Functions
Kårstø Rogaland Treatment of gas up to 88 million m3/day.
terminal Stabilisation and fractionation of unprocessed
condensate. NGL fractionation plant and
Ethane separation plant. Export of dry gas.
Kollsnes gas Hordaland Gas treatment up to 143 million m3/day.
processing plant NGL separation plant with capacity for 26
million m3/day. NGL transport to refinery.
Sture Hordaland Export terminal for crude oil. Comprises
terminal two jetties to berth tankers up to 300000
dwt. Storage of crude oil and LPG.
Mongstad Hordaland The complex comprises a refinery, a NGL
onshore facility fractionation plant, a crude oil terminal
and a combined heat and power plant.
Nyhamna Møre and Gas treatment for export to UK. Stabilisation
onshore facility Romsdal of condensate, storage and export by tankers.
Tjeldbergodden Møre and Gas receiving terminal, processing plants for
industrial complex Romsdal methanol, air separation and gas liquefaction
Melkøya Finnmark Production, storage and transport of LNG
onshore facility from processed well stream transported
through a 143km pipeline.
Future Veidnes Finnmark Oil storage facility in two mountain caverns.
terminal Export quay for transportation by tankers
(50-100 crude tankers/year estimated).
1Information retrieved from Statoil and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD)

Chapter7Arctic Specific Issues
Field developments in the Arctic have been under consideration for over 40 years
now. The first developments took place on the North Slope of Alaska in the late
1960s, exploration was extended to Greenland in 1976-1977, and the first exploration
activities in the European Arctic took place in the early 1980s in both the Norwegian
and Russian Arctic, with a number of oil and gas finds, including Snøhvit, Shokman
and Prirazlomnoye [1]. However, the challenging environment has established a
threshold on this type of developments.
The Arctic is a frontier operating environment where conditions are especially
challenging and often unpredictable. The additional challenges vary depending
on the Arctic region, but are mainly caused by low temperatures, ice and icing,
darkness, remoteness and a vulnerable environment. In addition, Arctic conditions
make the consequences of incidents more severe in terms of economic, personal or
environmental damages or losses.
The main issues influencing an Arctic field development will be addressed in
this chapter.
7.1 Physical Environment
The climate in the Arctic is harsh with strong and fast changing winds and low
temperatures. The weather can change very suddenly in the Arctic due to the Polar
Low Pressure phenomenon; changing wind direction and increasing wind speed
from 2 to 4 in the Beaufort scale within a few hours. In addition, weather forecasts
are usually more uncertain due to satellite constraints.
7.1.1 Surface air temperature
Low air temperatures are a typical characteristic of the Arctic region. However the
differences are apparent when comparing temperatures among stations at similar
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Figure 7.1: Mean January surface air temperature (℃) in the Arctic. Source:
AMAP
latitudes. For instance, the average temperature of January in the Canadian Arctic
being approximately -20℃ lower than that in the same latitude on Svalvard [6]. See
Figure 7.1.
Icing
Icing is a serious threat for Arctic shipping or offshore structures, and it is also a
major issue for coastal infrastructure, particularly if there is exposure to sea spray
and storms. For example the Melkøya LNG plant, outside Hammerfest in Norway
(Figure 7.2), has reported a number of technical problems due to temperature and
heavy icing, with more than 5cm of accumulated ice thickness being expected in
February and March [18].
The rate of icing depends on precipitation type, wind speed, air temperature
and sea surface temperature.
– Precipitation Types: types of precipitation in the Arctic that can cause icing
include:
. Freezing rain: not a major hazard.
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Figure 7.2: Melkøya LNG Plant, Norway. Source: Reuters/Haakon Mosvold
Larsen
. Arctic frost smoke: when the air temperature is below 0 ℃ and at least
9 ℃ colder than the sea
. Freezing spray: the most dangerous form of icing; when the air tempera-
ture is below the freezing temperature of the sea water (-2 ℃), the spray
freezes creating clear ice of glaze.
– Wind: sea spray depends on the wave conditions, and therefore on the wind
duration, speed and fetch. For critical temperature ranges (for instance lower
than -2 ℃), freezing ice appears for wind speeds higher than 9m/s. In general,
the lower the temperature and stronger the wind, more rapid ice accumulation
taking place.
– Air temperature: the critical range goes from -18 ℃ to 0 ℃. At temperatures
below -18 ℃, dry ice crystals form.
– Sea temperature: the critical range goes from -2.2 ℃ to 8.9 ℃, being -2.2 ℃
the freezing point for seawater of common salinity.
Icing, therefore, results in sea spray freezing on the structure or vessel, causing
machinery to seize up and/or loss of vessel stability [19].
Cold conditions
Cold temperatures affect both, people and materials. Materials exposed to cold
temperatures change their thermo-mechanical properties. Steel is more exposed to
brittle fracture under these conditions. Sensitive equipment needs to be designed
to resist freezing temperatures. In addition, fluids in cold temperature change their
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properties. For instance, oil viscosity increases with lower temperatures. Application
of specific low temperature lubricating oil can improve the performance of machines
exposed to this climate. Insulation, antifreeze liquids, heating or circulation of the
fluids are some of the methods used to combat the effects of low temperatures in
fluids other than oil.
7.1.2 Ice conditions
Ice conditions differ significantly depending on the regions of the Arctic Ocean. The
main reason is the influx of warm water from the Norwegian Atlantic current which
causes an open ice edge in the southern part of the Barents Sea, even in winter.
The predominate forms of ice in the Barents Sea are winter and young ice, with
some polar ice in the area between Franz Josef Land and Spitsbergen.
Thickness, size and concentration of ice are the most relevant and restrictive
factors. In the Barents Sea, the ice reaches its greatest extent in March and April
(up to 1.5-4.5m height), melting taking place rapidly between May and August,
after which freezing starts again. Sea ice is problematic where low temperatures
cause the sea surface to freeze into level ice which can cause large loads on the
structure, and be a complicating factor in rescue operations and oil spill response.
Ice ridges and icebergs may also cause problems due to large impact loads in case
of collision or scoring of pipelines and structures at the sea bottom in shallow areas.
An effective ice management is crucial [20].
7.1.3 Climate change factors
The current trend towards more ice free areas and longer periods is likely to continue
[21]. Access to some regions in the Arctic will improve as a result of the melting
ice. However, in other areas the accessibility may decrease for this same reason, for
instance melting permafrost on land could reduce accessibility.
7.2 Remoteness
Geographic isolation brings specific operational challenges, which entail substantial
costs and amplify the potential consequences of risk events [1]. Infrastructure and
capability to react against an emergency situation can be distant or unavailable. If
an installation is situated far from land, it will need to be selfsufficient when needed.
This applies for emergency, evacuation and oil spill response systems. Safe and
reponsible operations in Arctic regions can involve, therefore, important additional
costs.
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7.3 Visibility
Visibility can be an important operational issue in the Arctic.
The Arctic Circle, located at 66 ◦33 ′N , marks the southern limit where the
sun is above (polar day) and below (polar night) the horizon for 24 hours at least
once a year, being the effect prolonged in higher latitudes. During late autumn,
winter and early spring, limitations on visibility will occur due to the number of
hours in darkness. That season implies also the worst temperature and weather
conditions, making any operation much more complex. In addition, strain and
effort on personnel can increase due to darkness [7].
Other limitations to visibility are mainly blowing snow and fog. One of the
Arctic weather features is fog. It is usual to have more than 100 days/year with fog
in some areas. In summer, warm air moves in overlying cold ice and cold water,
condensing water, which forms thick fog fields, with peaks in relative humidity
in August. In winter ‘sea smoke’ may form over open water. Another condition
found in Arctic climates is ice fog, composed of ice crystals, which occurs mainly
for temperatures between -30 ℃ and -45 ℃. Visual observation of drifting ice can
be hard under these situations [6].
7.4 Human Factors
Arctic environmental conditions have a strong influence on the working environment
and technical safety of offshore operations. Design requirements need to be consid-
ered in order to ensure the facility´s integrity and operability requirements under
these conditions. Human factors are a major contributor to operational safety and
optimization of the performance. Arctic operations expose personnel to cold, windy
and wet conditions, which can cause different adverse effects on human health and
performance: thermal discomfort, increased strain, decreased performance and cold
related diseases and injuries [7]. A set of management practices and methods is
needed for work in cold environments, for instance cold and wind chill exposure
limits, winterization of facilities, clothing and personal protection equipment and
work, warm-up and rehabilitation regimes.
In ice-covered regions, safe Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) approaches
must be capable of accommodating a full spectrum of ice or open water situations,
which are often complicated by many other environmental and logistical factors.
Some of the major EER risks include:
– Traditional EER methods may not be appropriate for most part of the year
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– Long distances from the potential emergency site to the support bases and
other facilities
– Limited amount of time available to react to particular emergency situations
– Lack of qualified medical support
– Difficulties caused by communication due to high latitude and lack of satellite
coverage
– Full range of ice conditions, including icebergs and sea ice, combined with
cold, wind or other weather conditions
The EER risks are directly related to the installation type, function, location
and distance from rescue bases and resources. Arctic Evacuation Methods and
Emergency Response Vessel are important components within the total EER system.
The Barents 2020 Project [7], following the initiative of the Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, provides concrete guidance for safe exploration, production and
transportation of oil and gas in the Barents Sea.
7.5 Environmental Hazards
The Arctic environment can be described as highly vulnerable to pollution. The
Arctic, largely remains an unspoiled environment due to its remote location, low
population and historical absence of industry, making therefore an important
contribution to global biodiversity.
The probability of a hazardous event such an oil spill is not higher in the Arctic,
however the potential consequences, difficulties and costs of recovery, are likely to
be significantly greater.
There are many ways in which an ecosystem may be disturbed. Any development
will cause an ecosystem disturbance as it would be the case for any other area. For
instance the construction of pipelines, the noise pollution from drilling or increased
maritime traffic, disturbance of the seabed, or break-up of sea ice. However, even if
the potential pollution sources are broad and the probability of a risk event such
an oil spill is not higher in the Arctic, the risk of an oil spill is probably the most
relevant since it represents the greater potential environmental and economical
consequences. If a damaging event occurs in the Arctic region, it is likely to
have long term impacts due to the limited resilience of the natural environment,
making the environmental recovery process much harder to achieve. In addition,
the response to an oil spill in the Arctic is likely to be complicated by several factors
[22]:
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– Gaps in knowledge related to oil spill response (containment, dispersants and
clean-up) in Arctic waters.
– Limited accessibility and available time in some areas due to remoteness and
vast distances from infrastructure and services required to cope with such a
pollution event.
– Lower rate of natural evaporation and biodegradation of spilled oil due to the
lower Arctic temperatures.
This particular issue will be treated in detail in a separate chapter (Chapter 8),
since the environment is of particular importance in a cold climate or Arctic region,
where risk reduction should be the main driver for all work carried out.

Chapter8Oil Spills in Cold Climate
When moving oil production to cold climate areas, the risks of accidental oil spills
grow substantially due to more severe environmental conditions, remoteness and
lack of infrastructure. The same accident scenarios are valid as in temperate
areas, however, the consequences of accidents are likely to be more fatal, since the
resilience of the Arctic’s ecosystems in terms of withstanding risk events is weak.
Moreover, the extra challenges presented under cold climate conditions will require
of a different response. In other words, the probability of an oil spill in cold climate
is as in more temperate areas, however, its consequences might be more severe,
therefore, improved mitigating measures are needed.
Other hazardous and noxious substances might be released into Arctic waters
during the hydrocarbon production and transport, however, the focus of this
chapter is the spreading of oil, and the response techniques to oil spills in cold-water
environments.
8.1 Spill Risks
Oil spills may occur during any phase of oil exploration, production, transportation
or storage. The major potential sources of oil spills include:
– Well blowouts during exploration or production
– Releases during off-loading operations
– Leaks from subsea pipelines
– Spills from storage tanks
– Spills from vessels during transportation
Oil spills can be the result of a variety of factors, for instance human errors
or structural and mechanical failures. Arctic environmental conditions such as
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sea ice, low temperatures, darkness, high winds, and extreme storms increase the
probability of an accident or error that could cause a spill.
8.1.1 Spill risks from exploration and production
Well blowouts are the worst case of potential discharge during production. The
potential spilled volume from a blowout equals the volume of the reservoir that
could flow to the surface until the well is controlled [23]. Although well blowouts are
infrequent, they represent a threat during exploration and production, especially if
the reservoir size is large, and the pressure of the reservoir is particularly high.
A well blowout can occur at the surface, or on the sea bottom, which involves
an underwater release of oil travelling through the water column before reaching
the surface. Depending on the ice conditions, the oil may be trapped below the ice,
spread within the ice floes, or be incorporated into new forming ice [23].
In Arctic waters, oil spills from exploration and production activities have been
rare, however, the volume of exploration and production has been far less in Arctic
regions up to date. The largest blowout in the North Sea occurred at the Ekofisk B
platform in 1977, due to an incorrectly installed safety valve, which led to a 202000
bbl spill (Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1: Ekofisk blowout in the Norwegian North Sea, 1977. Source: Aftenbladet
8.1.2 Spill risks from transportation
Oil spill risks from transportation come from the main two transport schemes:
pipelines and tankers.
A subsea pipeline transporting oil from production units to onshore facilities
could suffer different release mechanisms: a sudden breach which may result in a
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rapid discharge, or a leak, which can be very damaging if it remains undetected
for a long period of time or if there is a problem to shut down the pressure in the
pipeline. The various causes for an offshore Arctic pipeline oil spill, may include
ice gouging, scour, permafrost thaw settlement, thermal loads and/or corrosion.
Significant amounts of oil were spilled due to an undetected pipeline leak in Alaska
during March 2006. Between 750-1000m3 of oil were leaked due to corrosion in the
pipeline during transport from the Prudhoe Bay oil field. Approximately 30% of
the spilled oil was recovered [24].
Oil tankers pose spill risks due to loading operations and while in transit.
The potential spilled volume varies, therefore, from a small spill during transfer
operations to a complete loss of cargo. The potential spill may be located above
or below the surface; in addition, the response involves additional challenges since
the spill could occur at any place in the transportation route. The Exxon Valdez
spill in 1989 (Figure 8.2), is a relevant example of oil spill in cold environment.
The tanker ran aground in Alaska while travelling outside normal shipping lanes to
avoid ice [24]. The vessel gashed its hull releasing 37000 tons of oil within six hours
of the grounding.
Figure 8.2: Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, March 1989. Source: USGS
Spill prevention measures for pipelines installed in ice covered waters include the
use of double walls, protection against corrosion and ice scouring and pre-scheduled
maintenance, inspection and repair programs due to the difficulty of access during
most part of the year. Prevention measures for tankers may include double hulls
and bottoms, ice or monitor weather, engineered systems for leak detection and
navigational safety programs [23].
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8.1.3 Spill risks from storage and loading
The main risks of oil spill from storage come from storage tanks, facility piping or
manifold valve systems on offshore platforms, and from onshore storage tanks in
terminals or refineries. The worst scenario is the spill of the whole volume stored in
the tank, or the volume of oil being transferred during loading operations. Spills
from offshore storage or loading, may flow directly to the water or ice surface, since
these facilities usually do not count with additional containment measures. Onshore
storage tanks in terminals, typically have a secondary containment around the
tanks. Each tank has to be surrounded by a concrete or earth wall at such distance
and of such height that in the event of the collapse of a full tank, the oil can be
contained within the bund [14].
According to a study of 242 tank accidents over the last 40 years [25], 48% of the
accidents occurred at oil refineries, 26% happened at terminals and during loading
operations, 13% occurred at petrochemical plants and only around 3% happened at
offshore storage tanks.
8.2 Behaviour of Oil Spilled in Cold-Water Environment
Both the behaviour of spilled oil in regions with sea ice and the vulnerabilities of
the Arctic ecosystem to spilled oil, need to be taken into account in any oil and gas
operation in an Arctic area.
The type of oil, temperature of the oil and the water, wind, currents, tides and
presence of sea ice, are some of the factors that will affect the behaviour, movement
and weathering1 processes. Table 8.1 shows the oil weathering processes which are
affected by the presence of sea ice (modified from [23]).
The type of ice present, their internal structure, and the timing of the release
relevant for the ice formation, will influence to a large extent the behaviour of the
spilled oil into ice-infested waters. Figure 8.3 shows the different oil-ice interactions
depending on the type of ice present.
In general, oil spills in ice spread much slower and occupy a smaller area than a
similar spill in open water. However, the oil could spread over a large distance if it
moves trapped within pieces of ice. The weathering process is slower in ice, which
might be an advantage for the response effectiveness in some scenarios [26]. On
the other hand, degradation is slower in coldwater areas than in temperate regions,
since the oil tends to move to a more viscous form, not evaporating as quickly,
1Weathering of oil: term used to describe the combination of processes that change the
properties of spilled oil with increasing time on the sea surface
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Table 8.1: Physical processes affected by the presence of sea ice
Process Open water Severe cold or ice
Spreading A thick layer of oil becomes Ice acts as a physical barrier or
thinner, covering a larger retardant, slowing the spreading
area of water and dispersion process
Drift Oil movement with wind Separate drift from the ice for
and currents <30% ice coverage, or drift with
ice for 60-70% ice coverage
Evaporation Relatively fast for Slowed by cold weather. Might be
thin oil films completely arrested if oil is buried
in snow or ice
Emulsification Depending on the type of oil. Might be lower due to the
Higher when breaking waves. reduced wave activity.
Figure 8.3: Possible distribution of spilled oil in ice-infested waters. Source:
AMAP
and making it less accessible to bacteria, which should slowly degrade petroleum
hydrocarbons spilled in the marine environment [23].
8.3 Response Techniques to Oil Spills
The Arctic is one of the most challenging areas for oil spill response. Sea ice, low
visibility, high winds, rough seas and cold temperatures complicate every aspect of a
spill response, from stopping a well blowout to predicting or mapping the movement
of an oil spill under sea ice. In addition, the different cleanup technologies face
operational limits due to wind speed, wave height, ice conditions and visibility
[23]. Once the limit is reached for one or a combination of these factors, a spill
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response operation might be slowed or shut down for periods of time varying from
days to months. On the other hand, the presence of sea ice may assist in the oil
spill response operations, by acting as a natural containtment barrier under certain
situations.
Effective oil spill recovery require advanced planning. The selection of the best
response option depends on site specific conditions such as sensitivity of the receiving
environment, ice coverage, weather, ice drift forecasts, etc.; and the assessment of
the environmental impact from applying the different response options [23].
– Mechanical recovery
This solution involves the physical containment of the oil by the use of booms,
and its subsequent removal from the surface by the use of skimmers. The
efficiency of the available technology varies depending on the type of ice and
its concentration. It is difficult to use booms (typical mechanical recovery
in open waters) when the ice coverage exceeds 15-30%, while in case the
ice coverage is higher, the ice itself may act as a boom confining the oil. A
skimmer in ice covered waters needs to deflect the ice in order to access the
oil. It is also necessary to deal with low temperatures, and freezing or icing
of the equipment [26]. Oil can be recovered with similar efficiency to that
of open water conditions in open leads and pockets between large ice floes,
however, reduced efficiency is expected in the presence of smaller ice floes and
slush ice [26].
SINTEF through the Joint Industry Program in Oil Spill Contingency for
Arctic and Ice Covered Waters [27], developed two prototipes of skimmers for
ice conditions which were tested in the Barents Sea during field experiments
in 2009 (Figure 8.4). The results showed that brush type skimmers represent
a good solution for ice processing and oil recovery. Moreover, skimmers with
thrusters showed an improved capability to recover oil in ice.
– In-situ burning
In-situ burning (Figure 8.5) can be used for oil on open water, on ice and
broken ice, if the adequate oil thickness to sustain burning is achieved (1 to
3mm for fresh crude, more than 3mm thick for weathered crude oil [23]). As
in mechanical recovery, ice may aid in the use of this technique by providing
natural containtment. For ice coverage up to 30%, the use of fire resistant
booms or chemical herding agents is generally required for achieving the
adequate thickness.
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Figure 8.4: Skimmer prototype "Framo" during field testing in the Barents Sea in
2009. Source: SINTEF
The window of opportunity for the use of in situ burning in ice covered waters,
is under some circumstances larger than in open sea. The presence of cold
water and ice can limit the spread of oil and slow the weathering processes
[28].
This technique has been proven and established as part of the oil spill con-
tingency plans in many Arctic areas. According to several field experiments
performed in the US, Canada and Norway, efficiencies over 90% have been
verified [27], showing this technique as one with the greater effectiveness in the
removal of both free floating oil in ice and oil collected in fire resistant booms.
Some of the factors influencing the success of the burning are slick thickness,
oil emulsification, igniter temperature, swell/waves and wind conditions.
Figure 8.5: Controlled in-situ burning for JIP Project. Source: SINTEF
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– Dispersants
Chemical dispersion can be used to enhance the formation of oil droplets in
order to accelerate the natural biodegradation of spilled oil.
The weathering processes are slowed down in the presence of ice and cold
temperatures, enabling a larger window of opportunity for chemical dispersion
of oil. Some oils spilled in ice, remain dispersible over a period of several days
[27]. However, mixing energy is required for the application of this technique.
Breaking waves in open water provide this mixing potential, however, in
ice covered waters, adding extra mixing energy is required to enhance the
dispersion process. An extra challenge is the lower salinity of cold waters,
which generally reduces the effectiveness of chemical dispersants. This option
presents extra concerns due to the little information about dispersant toxicity
to Arctic organisms and environments, which might be slower to recover from
exposure to toxic chemicals [23].
– Remote Sensing
Oil spill detection and mapping is important under cold climate conditions,
as oil may be hidden under snow and ice during periods of almost total dark-
ness. The combination of sensors operating from aircraft, helicopters, vessels,
satellites and the ice surface is recommended for Arctic oil spill emergency
preparedness [27]. An ideal system has the capability of determining if oil
is present and map the boundaries of potential contamination. Some of the
most useful remote sensors and systems applicable to Arctic spills are: Side
Looking Airbone Radar (SLAR); aircraft and vessel-based Forward Infrared
(FLIR); trained dogs; and Ground Penetreting Radar (GPR) operated from
helicopters or from the ice surface [27].
Figure 8.6 summarizes the accepted response limits for mechanical recovery
(with and without ice management) and in-situ burning, for different climatic
limiting factors such as ice coverage, wind, sea state and visibility2. The green
cells represent favourable conditions for the response technique. The yellow cells
represent impediments in the response operation, while the red cells indicate that
the reponse option is not possible under that specific situation. It is important
to notice that not only a red cell can shut down a response, but a combination of
yellow cells may have a cumulative impact on the response.
2Chemical dispersion is not included in this matrix due to the immaturity of the technology
under cold climate conditions, not being an authorized response method in some areas, for instance
the US Arctic Ocean.
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8.4 Knowledge Gaps and R&D Priorities
Significant gaps exist in knowledge, planning, and oversight in the areas of oil spill
risks, impacts and response capabilities. In addition, baseline science for Arctic
marine environments is improving but is still limited. There is, therefore, a research
need to better understand the behaviour and impact of oil spilled in a seasonal ice
environment and specific technology priorities.
– Arctic Oil Spill Impacts
Most of the existing knowledge in oil toxicity and chemical interaction comes
from temperate climate studies. Oil spills impacts in cold locations might be
significant and long lasting. The 2008 Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment Scientific
Findings and Recommendations (AMAP Assessment [24]) emphasizes that the
current state of knowledge regarding Arctic oil spill impacts and oil toxicity
to Arctic species is extremely limited. In the Norwegian Barents Sea, research
carried out by SINTEF [28], has added knowledge on the sensitivity of Arctic
species to dispersed oil and other contaminants.
– Arctic Oil Spill Trajectory Models
Better trajectory modeling is needed to develop realistic oil spill planning
scenarios. Existing models are not able to accurately predict how oil and ice
interactions will affect oil movement under ice carried by currents and oil
drifting with the sea ice [24].
– Other Research and Technology Priorities
. Solutions and technologies adapted to be used in cold climate (including
ice), seasonal darkness and remote locations.
. Reliable surveillance and monitoring (subsea and on surface) technologies,
including automatic detection of spills and leakages.
. Standardized methods for efficiency testing of oil spill response equipment
and techniques.
Chapter9Technical Aspects for Pipelinesand Harbours
Feasible and cost effective terminal concepts for cold climate areas need specific
assessments of technical solutions and design parameters. It has already been
pointed out that environmental issues are of critical importance in cold climate
areas, which makes safety and reliability of structures even more significant, requiring
redundancy and backup solutions for safe operations. This chapter focus on technical
considerations to take into account under cold climate scenarios, related to pipeline,
breakwater and harbour design.
9.1 Pipeline Design Specific Issues
Due to climate conditions and ice coverage, the design and installation of pipelines
in cold climate areas, imposes certain challenges that do not apply elsewhere. These
include the evaluation of environmental and geotechnical data, specific design
according to those conditions, and construction and installation limited by harsh
environmental conditions.
9.1.1 Environmental loading
Some of the main considerations with respect to pipeline design for cold climate areas
include ice gouging, thaw settlement of permafrost, upheaval buckling and strudel
scour. These loading conditions on subsea pipelines will be presented separately
here, however, assessment of interaction situations will usually be required for a
specific project.
– Ice Gouging
Ice gouging represents one of the main threats to submarine pipelines in the
Arctic, being therefore among the key design issues in both pipeline design
and route selection. The phenomenon is caused by ice masses running aground
in shallow waters. The ice bodies are mainly icebergs or ice ridges which have
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Figure 9.1: Simplified scheme of an ice keel-seabed interaction. Source: Touch
Briefings
a keel extending below the water surface, cutting deep gouges into the seabed
(Figure 9.1). For a safe design, the soil displacement induced at the pipeline
depth, and the resulting pipe strains must be assessed and checked against
design limits.
Ice ridge gouging often increases with depth outside the fast ice zone, with
the maximum gouges found between 20 and 40m. This phenomenon has
been observed in many Arctic locations such as the Canadian Arctic Islands,
offshore Sakhalin, the north area of the Caspian and the Beaufort Sea, with
dimensions of around 80m wide and up to 5m deep [29].
The loads generated on the seabed by a gouging ice body might be between 10
and 100MN [30]. It is thus, impractical to design a pipe which can withstand
those loads. Therefore, a protective measure needs to be approached. The
main alternatives are: ice management, shielding and trenching-burial (Figure
9.2).
◦ Ice management: deviating the drifting of ice features threatening the
structure through the use of ice management is a possible approach
for specific situations. However, this may not be an optimum solution
when considering protection of the whole length of a pipeline against ice
gouging, due to the resources that would be required for ice detection
and management. Furthermore, this is not an adequate solution in the
shore approach zone.
◦ Shielding: construction of a protective structure which absorbs the energy
delivered by a potential ice body impact, might be a solution, for instance,
adopted for the pipeline´s shore approach. However, it would not be a
cost-effective technique to be applied over longer stretches of pipeline.
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Figure 9.2: Protection against ice gouging: a)ice management; b) shielding with
a structure; c) burial at a burial depth BD. Source: P. Barrette, 2011
◦ Trenching and burial: this is the common approach for protection against
ice gouging, which in addition presents advantages in terms of protection
against loading from waves and currents, thermal insulation and buckling,
for instance [31].
The main issue to be addressed is the optimization of a safe and economic
burial depth given the length of this type of pipelines. Gouging by an ice
keel results in large sub-scour horizontal and vertical deformations [32],
not guaranteering the safety of a pipeline buried below the maximum
scour depth predicted. To make this option economically feasible, ice
management can be used in combination with a trenching approach,
reducing the probability of an encounter.
A new approach suggests the use of a weak layer above the pipeline in
order to reduce forces and soil displacements transmitted downwards
[31], which could be translated in a reduction of pipe burial depth. This
has been shown recently by a study on protection of subsea pipelines
against ice ridge gouging [33], which suggests to trench the pipeline right
below the possible gouge with the subsequent backfilling by very soft clay
on top of the pipeline, and with the insitu sand to the original seabed
level. This was shown to minimize the scour depth allowing clay to flow
around the pipeline, without substantial resistance [33].
– Thaw Settlement
Thaw settlement is an important issue for pipeline design in cold climate
areas. Transport of oil or gas from an offshore field to an onshore terminal,
may involve a buried pipeline crossing permafrost. In the nearshore area
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Figure 9.3: Offshore to onshore permafrost section. Source: J.F. Nixon, 1991
(Figure 9.3), when the pipeline is in operation, temperatures above the melting
point of the surrounding permafrost might cause thaw, reducing the carrying
capacity of the soil, and therefore, causing settlements beneath the pipeline.
The effects are worsened if differential thaw settlement occurs. That is the
case in areas of low thaw settlement, such as sands and gravels, adjacent to
areas of high sensitivity to settlement such as silts and clays. These differential
settlements would result in curvatures and bending strains in the pipe.
According to an analysis on thaw subsidence effects on pipelines in the Beaufort
Sea [34], a buried offshore pipeline under the range of soils considered in the
study, was able to accomodate up to 1m of thaw settlement if the permafrost
layer was located 3 to 4m below the pipeline. However, when the permafrost
layer is closer to the pipe base, a mitigation solution is required to reduce the
possible damages in the pipeline.
Some of the techniques to minimize settlements of thawing permafrost may
be the use of a thaw-stable bed of gravel beneath the pipeline or the use of a
foam sheet insulation around the pipe [29].
– Upheaval Buckling
A buried steel pipeline may suffer thermal expansion during operation, when
the temperature and pressure are higher than the ones experienced during
installation. Expansion is restrained by the surrounding soil, and in that case,
an axial compressive force develops (Figure 9.4), which will tend to move
the pipe upwards. The pipeline response might be unacceptable in case of
excessive vertical displacements or plastic yield deformations [35].
Although this issue is not unique to cold climate environments, pipes in such
conditions are installed at lower temperatures, experiencing therefore a larger
temperature gradient when operation starts. In addition, the pipeline could
become exposed, increasing the risks of ice keel impacts [29].
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Figure 9.4: Upheaval buckling illustration. Source: B. Abdalla et al., 2008
The design should take into account the minimum backfill thickness to be
placed on top of the pipeline to hold it into the installed position, and the
maximum permissible vertical displacement of the installed pipe.
Since this mechanism is very sensitive to imperfections or points of residual
vertical curvature in the pipeline, the main way to minimize the risk of
buckling is the use of additional backfill weight over these imperfection points.
– Strudel Scour
Strudel scour is possible in cold climate areas in the presence of a stream
flowing over the surface of an ice sheet in the nearshore zone. The overflowing
water drains through cracks in the ice sheets, being able to scour the seabed
depending on the resulting velocities and volumes of water (Figure 9.5). This
phenomenon has been observed in some pipelines in Arctic projects. At the
Beaufort Sea, in the Northstar development, a strudel scour of 30 meters wide
was documented, having a maximum depth measured of 1.7 meters [36].
The probability of a strudel scour should be evaluated prior to designing for
such phenomena.
Figure 9.5: Strudel scour illustration. Source: B. Abdalla et al., 2008
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9.1.2 Shore approach protection solutions
A pipeline shore approach is defined as the section from where the pipeline enters
the breaking wave zone to the point where it reaches shore [37].
The analysis and design of the pipeline shore approach, presents unique demand-
ing issues that are not present in deep water pipeline sections. Particularly in cold
climate areas, designing shore approaches is often more problematic due to coastal
erosion and pipeline interaction with nearshore permafrost.
Among the shoreline protection solutions are the following:
– Tunneling
If continuous permafrost is present in the area, a tunnel may be an appropriate
solution for the nearshore area. For this solution to be feasible, the permafrost
temperature in the area must be sufficiently low for drilling and mantaining
the tunnel without artificial refrigeration [11].
This method has been already applied in several field developments in the
Norwegian coast. For instance, tunnels have been the design chosen for the
wet gas pipelines from the Troll and Kvitebjørn fields arriving at the Kollsnes
gas processing plant.
The pipelines arriving from the North Sea at the Kårstø processing plant, are
placed in 600m concrete tunnel, consisting of 5 bridge elements, at the shore
approach [38].
– Retaining structures
Retaining walls may be built in order to protect the shoreline from erosion,
preventing the potential degradation at the crossing point. The different
structures can be sheet pile walls, concrete retaining structures, and cellular
sheet pile walls. The last one offers several advantages, although is the more
expensive option [11]. The cells are filled with site material, which is stable
while is frozen. Refrigerating systems such as thermosyphons may be installed
inside the cells for that purpose.
Some Arctic projects such as the PanArctic Drake and Pioneer Oooguruk projects
in the Canadian and US Arctic, have explored innovative mehods to protect and
install pipelines in extreme environmental conditions.
The Drake field pipeline was the first arctic subsea pipeline transporting gas
(1978) to a production facility onshore at Melville Island, Canada. The shore
approach solution (Figure 9.6), involved placing the pipeline in a shallow trench,
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Figure 9.6: Shore approach for the Drake pipeline. Source: SNAME
1.5m deep, back filling the trench with gravel and freezing the soil around the pipe,
forming a strong cyllinder of artificial permafrost [39]. This artificial permafrost
system extends from 15m onshore to 280m offshore, where there is a water depth of
20m. An increased protection was given in the shallow water area by constructing
a grounded ice berm of 2.1m thick, which was built using ice platform construction
techniques1.
For the Oooguruk oil field in Alaska, produced fluids are transported to shore
by a multiphase pipe-in-pipe system. The shore crossing consists of a narrow beach
and an eroding bluff of approximately 2.5m. The shore crossing (Figure 9.7), was
set back 60m from the bluff line to accommodate predicted shoreline erosion and
potential for ice over riding. In addition, the shore approach design included a thaw
stable gravel bedding beneath the pipe and a short length foam sheet insulation.
This thermal design was chosen to keep the thaw-unstable permafrost frozen and
to keep the pipelines from settling [40].
Finally, an option that might be also considered, is to set an acceptable shoreline
degradation. In this case, there are no shoreline protection measures, but a level
of permanent degradation, based on the present erosion rate is accepted. Aspects
such as erosion rate and design lifetime of the pipeline must be taken into account
to assess the profile of the pipeline at the crossing point. In case the level of erosion
increases unexpectedly, it is possible to proceed protecting the shore crossing, for
instance through a concrete protection [11].
1This technique consists of flooding and natural freezing of the ice in layers, up to the desired
thickness.
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Figure 9.7: Oooguruk shore crossing aerial photograph. Source: G. Lanan et al.,
2008
9.2 Breakwater Design Specific Issues
Terminals need to be protected from environmental conditions to achieve safe tanker
operations. Breakwaters are built for that purpose. The main difference in the
design of breakwaters in cold climate, is that they are subjected to ice actions in
addition to wave forces.
Recent developments in cold climate breakwater design, for instance in Norway
or Iceland, favour the use of berm type breakwaters. The main advantages for
the use of this type of breakwater in cold climate harbours will be reviewed in
the following sections. However, these type of structures require good quality
rock access. The caisson type breakwater is usually a good alternative for cold
environments, in case that suitable rocks are not available at the site [32].
9.2.1 Berm breakwaters as protection for cold climate harbours
Berm breakwaters (Figure 9.8), present several advantages as harbour protection in
Arctic areas compared to a conventional rubble mound breakwater [32], [41], [42]:
– Less mass of the individual armour stones is required than for a classical
rubble mound breakwater.
– Limits the ride up events if ice is present and thus, limits the possibility of
ice floes overtopping the crest of the breakwater.
– The piling up of ice on the berm may have a consolidation effect on the
breakwater, limiting potential global failures.
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– Greater acceptance tolerances with respect to placement accuracy.
– Readily available and less specialized construction equipment and labor com-
pared to the construction of a conventional rubble mound.
– Increases navigational safety for narrow entrances with heavy breaking waves
due to decreased reflection, compared to conventional breakwaters.
– Low overtopping potential, which benefits the protection of cold climate har-
bours, due to potential icing from spray in the berths behind the breakwaters.
Figure 9.8: Cross section of the Sirevåg berm breakwater. HS,100 = 7.0m;
TZ = 10.6s; H0T0 = 48. Berm: 20m wide. Source: A. Tørum et al., 2011
Some experiences of breakwater design in cold climate regions, confirm the
efficiency of berm breakwaters against extreme environmental actions, including
ice.
The North Bay area in Ontario, Canada, presents an interesting case in which
two breakwaters, a conventional rubble mound and a berm breakwater, are located
closed to each other. The behaviour of these two breakwaters after the winter season
in 1988, showed that while the rubble mound suffered severe damage by ice, the
berm breakwater suffered almost no damage in the same event. The berm reduces
the likelihood of rock movement by ice. Moreover, the presence of ice between rocks,
may act as a cement to help resist external ice forces [43].
The berm breakwater in Sirevåg, Norway (Figure 9.8), was hit by a severe storm
in 2002. The maximum recording during the storm was HS = 9.75m, and the wave
height exceeded HS = 8.5m for a duration of 3 hours [44], well above the design
wave of HS,100 = 7m. The breakwater survived the storm without any reshaping,
and only a few stones were moved from the original location (Figure 9.9). Moreover,
an analysis of the probability of failure regarding recession on the Sirevåg berm
breakwater carried out by A. Tørum et al. in 2011, using Monte Carlo simulations,
showed that the breakwater is extremely strong, which in general should favour the
berm breakwater designs [41].
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Figure 9.9: The Sirevåg berm breakwater after the storm in January 2002. Source:
P. Bruun, 2006
9.2.2 Icelandic type berm breakwater
Berm breakwaters have different stability criteria, and may be divided in three
categories:
– Reshaped static stable berm breakwater, i.e. the profile is reshaped into a
profile which is stable and where the individual stones are stable too.
– Reshaped dynamic stable berm breakwater, i.e. the profile is reshaped into a
stable profile, but the individual stones may move up and down the slope.
– Non-reshaped static stable berm breakwater (Icelandic type), i.e. only few
stones are allowed to move.
Traditionally, berm breakwaters have been able to reshape statically or dinamically.
A modification of the original berm breakwater has been developed in Iceland as a
statically stable berm breakwater (Icelandic type). The structure is more stable
and at the same time involves less volume [44]. This is the case of the Sirevåg
breakwater presented in the previous section.
The Icelandic type breakwater uses several narrowly graded armour classes. The
larger armour classes are placed at the most exposed locations within the cross
section. These armour classes, have a higher porosity than wider graded armours,
and thus higher permeability, which increases the stability of the structure and
decreases both the overtopping and reflection from the structure.
An Islandic type breakwater, was chosen to protect the Melkøya LNG terminal
in Norway (Figure 9.10). Since the terminal is located in a cold climate area at
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Figure 9.10: Icelandic type berm breakwater protecting Melkøya terminal, Norway.
Source: Statoil
70 ◦N , icing from frozen sea spray is an important issue, and represents significant
difficulties for the terminal operations. One of the main reasons for using an Icelandic
berm breakwater as harbour protection in this case, was therefore the potential
reduction of wave overtopping, in order to avoid icing issues in the terminal.
9.2.3 Caisson type breakwater
Other proposed designs for cold climate harbour protection, are caisson type
breakwaters. This is an option in case suitable rock material is not available.
Knowledge on ice forces from other type of structures used in the oil industry, have
been applied to some extent to the caisson type breakwater [42].
The design of caisson breakwaters to withstand wave and ice loads, usually
implies a larger height than the normally used for a conventional caisson breakwater.
The reason is mainly protection against ice pile-up. Although different ice load
codes give significantly different values, the given ice loads are, in general, larger
than the wave loads, requiring therefore a much wider and heavier caisson design.
According to A. Tørum (2011), a caisson with a slopping front may be an attractive
solution [42].
Most caisson type breakwaters are built with rectangular shaped caissons.
However, circular caissons have been used in some harbours, i.e. Hanstholm,
Denmark. According to a recent study on wave forces on a composite breakwater
with circular caissons [45], this type of breakwater may be an option in feasibility
studies for high risk breakwaters. This breakwater concept has been studied for a
breakwater under planning for protection of a LNG terminal in Teriberka, Russia,
which is planned to process and export the gas coming from the Shtokman field
(Figure 9.11).
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Figure 9.11: Composite breakwater with circular caissons used for model tests by
A. Tørum et al., 2012. Source: A. Tørum et al., 2012
The breakwater dimensions are 1150m long at a maximum water depth of 55m.
The design wave for the Ultimate Limit State (ULS) is HD = 16m and Tp = 15.8s.
The results show a significant reduction on horizontal wave forces compared with
the forces obtained in a vertical straight wall. Even with an overprediction of
10% for the Goda formula (see Appendix A), the results still indicate a reduction
between 10-15% for high waves by using circular caissons instead of plain wall
vertical caissons [45].
9.2.4 Shoulder ice barrier
A new concept for ice barrier structures, is the Shoulder Ice Barrier (SIB) (Figure
9.12). The main modification to traditional ice barriers, is the shoulder section,
which aims to collect smaller ice pieces and to avoid ice overriding [46].
Figure 9.12: Shoulder ice barrier illustration. Source: A. Gurtner, 2009
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The idea behind the shoulder section has been developed from the design of
static stable berm breakwaters. The SIB concept, is designed as a gravity based
caisson structure with the so called “shoulder section”. The main purpose of this
design is that the ice can potentially override the inclined surface and stabilize on
top of the shoulder section. The generation of the ice rubble, and consequently
the extra weight placed on top of the structure, provides extra sliding resistance
(Figure 9.13).
Figure 9.13: Enhanced barrier sliding resistance. Source: A. Gurtner, 2009
Model tests of the SIB concept were carried out at the Hamburg Ship Model
Basin, Germany, during 2007. The results showed that the shoulder section per-
formed its function satisfactorily, breaking the ice in smaller pieces and avoiding ice
overriding [47].
Although the main purpose of ice barriers is protection of offshore structures
against drifting ice and against significant loads exerted by the ice-structure inter-
action, the SIB concept may also be used as a breakwater at ice infested harbour
locations. In that case, the wave forces may govern the stability and therefore
the design of the structure. Thus, a modified version of SIB for 16m water depth
was tested in a wave flume at the Norwegian University of Science and Technol-
ogy (NTNU), in 2007. The results of the measured wave forces and overturning
moments showed, that the wave forces are significantly reduced compared to the
results obtained applying the Goda formula (see Appendix A) for vertical wall
caissons [48].
9.2.5 Theoretical formalisms
A quantitative discussion regarding berm and caisson breakwaters is presented
in this section. For berm breakwaters, the stone size has been determined as a
function of wave height and period. For the caisson breakwater type, the maximum
horizontal force on the vertical wall has been determined as a function of wave
height and period. Two Excel programs have been set up for this purpose. The
detailed formulations, parameters employed, and generation of curves can be seen
in Appendix A.
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1. Berm Breakwater
Several threshold criteria are defined to prevent the movement of rock (Table
9.1). If the hydraulic load exceeds the mobility threshold, instability of the
armour layer occurs, and the stones move. The most used parameters to
evaluate the stability of the armour layer are the stability number H0 (A.1),
and the period stability number, H0T0 (A.2).
Table 9.1: Mobility criteria
Category H0 (A.1) H0T0 (A.2)
Non-reshaping <2 <40
Reshaping, static stable <2.7 40-70
Reshaping, dynamic stable >2.7 >70
Both numbers can be used as stability criteria for the armour layer. If H0 is
used, only the effect of wave height is being taken into account. If H0T0 is
used, wave height and period are combined with the same exponent2.
An Excel program has been set up in order to calculate the dependency of the
armour size on wave height and wave period. Reference is made to Appendix
A for the detailed explanations on the generation of curves. Figure 9.14 shows
the results obtained for the Icelandic berm breakwater, by using the stability
number as mobility criteria. Thus, only the effect of the wave height is taken
into account.
Figure 9.14: Stone size as a function of significant wave height by using H0 as
mobility criteria for non-reshaping breakwater.
2The criteria presented is for an angle of attack β = ±20 ◦, and depends on stone gradiation.
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It can be observed that, for instance, a significant wave height of HS = 8m
would mean a requirement of approximately W50 = 40t for the largest armour
class.
If the period stability number is used as mobility criteria, then the effect of
wave period is included in the calculation of the armour size. Figure 9.15
shows the results obtained for the non-reshaped static stable case for five
different wave heights.
Figure 9.15: Stone size as a function of significant wave height and mean period
by using H0T0 as mobility criteria for non-reshaping breakwater.
It can be observed that the curves get steeper with increasing wave height.
That means that a change in mean period from Tz = 5s to Tz = 10s represents
a stone mass requirement of 2.5 tons to 10 tons approximately for a significant
wave height of HS = 4m. However, if the wave height is HS = 12m, the
difference in period involves a large difference in rock size requirement, going
from 20t for the 5s period up to 90t for the 10s period.
Moreover, both graphs (Figures 9.14 and 9.15) can be compared for the same
wave height, for instance HS = 8m. The use of the stability number as
mobility criteria gives us a stone size requirement of 40t (Figure 9.16). If the
period stability number is used as mobility criteria, for the same wave height
HS = 8m, the W50 = 40t mass of the largest armour layer corresponds with
a mean period of Tz = 10s. However, this value may vary significantly in case
the actual wave period does not correspond to that exact value. For instance,
for the same wave height of HS = 8m, an increased period of Tz = 13s would
give a requirement of W50 = 63t by using this criteria (Figure 9.17).
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Figure 9.16: Stone size dependence on wave parameters by using different mobility
criteria. Use of stability number.
Figure 9.17: Stone size dependence on wave parameters by using different mobility
criteria. Use of period stability number.
For a comparison of results for non-reshaped and reshaped static stable berm
breakwaters, see Appendix A.
2. Caisson Breakwater
The maximum horizontal force on the vertical wall of a caisson breakwater has
been calculated, using Goda formulation, as a function of wave parameters
such as design wave height (HD) and peak period (Tp). An Excel program has
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been set up for this purpose. Appendix A, presents the detailed formulations,
caisson configuration and parameters used for the calculations.
Figure 9.18 shows the results obtained for the maximum horizontal force on
the vertical wall of a caisson as a function of the design wave height and for
four different wave peak periods. Notice the geometry of the caisson used for
the calculations, Figure A.4.
Figure 9.18: Maximum horizontal force on the vertical wall as a function of wave
height and period
The results show an approximately linear trend incrementing around 500kN/m
for a variation of 2m in the maximum wave height. The wave period in this case
does not influence extremely the maximum horizontal force. The difference
between a wave peak period of Tp = 13s and Tp = 19s for the same wave
height, shows a variation of around 300kN/m.
9.3 Harbour Oscillations
Harbour oscillations are wave motions of long periods that may cause damaging
surge and disruption in harbour activities. The oscillations are caused by standing
waves with periods between 30 seconds and 10 minutes. This type of long period
waves may be free long waves generated out in the ocean, or bound long waves
associated with groups of storm waves.
Even relatively small vertical motions can be accompanied by large horizontal
motions. Factors influencing the characteristics of the oscillations are generally
controlled by basin shape, size and water depth [49]. The situation is more damaging
if the incoming period matches the natural period of oscillation of the harbour.
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If the characteristic length of the harbour is of the same order of magnitude as
the wave length associated with an important mode of oscillation, large resonant
motions may result. The phenomenon is also referred to as harbour resonance.
In addition, moored ships may have the same range of periods as harbour
oscillations, so these can create dangerous issues regarding high mooring forces,
fender system problems, vessel collisions and delays in loading operations at the
harbour.
Harbour oscillations are usually initiated by forcing through the harbour entrance,
thus, they can not be considered closed basins. Harbour oscillations differ from long
period standing oscillations in closed water bodies in the main following ways [50]:
– Harbour oscillations are usually initiated by forcing water through the harbour
entrance from the open sea. The main forcing mechanisms include infragravity
waves, currents moving past the entrance and generating eddies, and tsunamis
or local seismic activity.
– Energy losses of harbour oscillation are mainly due to radiation through the
harbour entrance.
– A harbour basin can resonate in a specific fundamental mode referred as
Helmholtz resonance. This mode is absent in closed basins.
In harbours of simple geometry, modes of oscillation may be predicted from the
shape of the basin. In those cases, the response characteristics can be determined
based on analytic solutions, approximating the geometry of the harbour by an
idealized, simple shape such as a rectangle.
A harbour basin generally has several modes of oscillation with corresponding
natural resonant periods and harmonics. The most important mode is the fun-
damental or lowest mode (n=0). For the simplest case, a rectangular basin with
uniform depth, the fundamental mode of resonance occurs when the wavelength of
the wave is equal to four times the length of the harbour (Figure 9.19).
The general expression for the free oscillation period is:
Tn =
4lb
(1 + 2n)
√
gd
(9.1)
where:
Tn: natural free oscillation period
n: number of nodes along the basin axis
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Figure 9.19: Surface profiles for the first four oscillating modes in open rectangular
basins of uniform depth. Source: A. B. Rabinovich, 2008
lb: basin length along the axis
g: acceleration of gravity
d: water depth
Of important concern for harbour operations and ships, are the strong currents
associated with the standing waves. The maximum horizontal velocities occur at
the nodes. Therefore, the locations in the vicinity of the nodes are the potentially
more risky and unsafed areas [50]. The maximum current can be estimated as:
Vmax =
H
2
√
g
d
(9.2)
where:
Vmax: is the maximum horizontal velocity at the node
H: is the standing wave height
Figure 9.20 shows a practical graph for evaluation of resonant length and
amplification factor3 of rectangular harbours with symmetric entrance.
3The amplification factor is defined as the ratio of wave height along the back wall of the
harbour to standing wave height along a straight coastline (twice the incident wave height).
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Figure 9.20: Resonant length and amplification factor of symmetrical rectangular
harbours. Source: Coastal Engineering Manual
For reading the graph, it is important to define the relative harbour length klb,
where k = 2pi/L is the wave number, and lb is the basin length. The klb values
(x-axis) can be converted to resonant periods by the following expression [49]:
T = 2pilb√
gd
1
klb
(9.3)
The curves represent a range of basin aspect ratios lw/lb, which relates the width
of the basin (lw) with its length (lb); and relative entrance withds B/lw, in which
B is the width of the mouth. As it can be observed, the character of the natural
oscillation in the harbour depends strongly on the relative aperture. The smaller
the width of the entrance, and thus the ratio B/lw, the slower the entrance of water
penetrating from open sea into the basin. By narrowing the harbour entrance, the
amplification factor increases, and therefore the arriving wave is amplified. The
operational impact of harbour oscillations is defined by the amplification factor
(y-axis). An amplification factor A > 5 will cause some problems, while a factor
A > 10 will mean major operational problems [49].
The ratio between the natural period of the harbour and the incoming wave
period (TN/T ), determines the degree of amplification. The greatest amplification
occurs when TN/T = 1. The amplification factor decreases at each successive higher
CHAPTER 9: TECHNICAL ASPECTS 83
order mode, therefore, simple analysis methods usually focus only on the lowest
order modes [49].
The worst case scenarios, which involve low modes of resonance and the greatest
amplification (TN/T = 1), have been represented in Figures 9.21 and 9.22 applying
(9.1) for different water depths and simplified rectangular harbour basin lengths,
resulting in the different wave periods that would cause harbour resonance for each
configuration.
For the selection of the water depths used in the analysis, reference is made to
the information contained in Chapter 5, section 5.4.2, where the main dimensions
of liquid bulk carriers where presented, including their fully loaded draught. It can
be seen that the bigger crude oil tankers might have a deep draught (i.e. up to
24m), while the LNG gas carriers and intermediate size oil tankers are in the range
of 12m. Based on that, depths of 15m (Figure 9.21) and 25m (Figure 9.22) have
been plotted.
It can be observed from the resulting graphs, that deeper harbours are more
prone to harbour oscillation concerns. Focusing the attention on the fundamental
mode of resonance (n=0), it can be observed that the differences between the 15m
depth port and the 25m depth port, are significant. For instance, a deepwater port
accomodating large crude oil tankers (Figure 9.22), with a rectangular basin of
around 200m, will result in a resonance situation for waves with periods around
16s, which is not an uncommon situation. As it will be seen later on in this report,
peak periods for the 100 year return period are of the order of 15s for both Melkøya
and the future Veidnes terminal for Johan Castberg field. It is therefore of great
importance to take into account the resonance phenomena inside the harbour during
design, specially for deepwater harbours with the intention of accommodating large
draught oil tankers.
In the majority of situations, the harbour will differ significantly from a simple
shape. For these cases, physical and numerical model tools can be effectively applied
for accurate results regarding the wave conditions and behaviour in the harbour.
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Figure 9.21: Resonance in a 15m water depth harbour for low resonance modes.
Figure 9.22: Resonance in a 25m water depth harbour for low resonance modes.
Chapter10Operational Aspects of Terminals
Specific issues are relevant to develop a terminal project in a cold climate or Arctic
region. This chapter will address some of the main operational aspects to take into
account when dealing with Arctic terminals.
10.1 Terminal Arrangement
10.1.1 Harbour layout
Oil and gas terminal layout in cold climate environments does not differ substantially
from the design basis for temperate harbours.
The location of the terminal berth should pursue the following principles [16]:
– Oil and gas berths are separated from other port facilities for safety reasons.
No other shipping should be allowed inside the harbour basin.
– The berth shall be fugitive, if possible. This means that the ship could stay at
berth under all weather conditions. This is particularly interesting for liquid
gas tankers, as these can only sail with the tanks either full or empty, since
contrary to oil tankers, gas carriers have no partitions in their cargo tanks.
When in open sea, if partially filled, a rupture of the tank wall and loss of
stability of the ship may occur due to sloshing of fluid in the tank.
– The orientation of the berth, if possible, should be such that the mooring
loads are minimized. Usually this is achieved by aligning the berth axis with
the current direction. In case the current is weak, it is advised to orient it
parallel to the prevailing wind direction.
The type of structure used for oil and gas berths varies from quays to jetties
(Figure 10.1). Table 10.1 shows the main advantages and disadvantages of the two
types of structure.
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Figure 10.1: Comparison between a quay and jetty layout for berthing. Source:
modified from Thoresen, 2010
Table 10.1: Comparison between structures for oil and gas berths
Type of Advantages Disadvantages
Structure
Jetty Flexible structure Vulnerable for abnormal berthing
Prefabrication Vulnerable for ice loads
General low costs Low flexibility in range of vessels
Easy construction Maintenance costs
Quay wall Stability of the structure Higher costs
Reduction on berthing energy Difficulties in construction
Easier spill response for deeper water
Safer escape routes One vessel moored at the time
It can be observed, that for a non-Arctic harbour, jetties would usually be the
preferred option due to its flexibility, prefabrication and in general relatively low
costs. However, for cold climate terminals, jetties present several disadvantages
compared to a straight quay wall, particularly due to ice loads and difficulties in oil
spill response.
10.1.2 Offshore oil loading concepts
In cold climate areas, and in the presence of ice covered waters, the action of sea
ice may cause large loads, globally or locally, making not feasible the use of a
conventional loading system used in open waters. The different loading systems
used for export from an offshore terminal (Figure 10.2), in ice covered waters, can
be divided in two categories:
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Figure 10.2: Arctic offshore loading concepts. a) Platform corner loading; b)
Tower loading; c) Single Anchor Loading (SAL); d) Submerged Turret Loading
(STL). Source: INTSOK
1. Mooring and loading in the wake of a structure
– Direct platform loading (i.e. Prirazlomnoye, Russia)
The loading takes places directly at the production platform through
loading arms located at the corners of the structure (Figure 10.3). The
tanker is then moored at a fixed point and has limited manoeuvrability
range to stay in the platform lee without disconnecting in case of direction
changes in ice drift [51]. This represents an economical option but suffers
of operational risks related to impacts between tanker and structure.
Figure 10.3: Platform corner loading concept top view. Source: B Bonnemaire,
2006
– Loading tower (i.e. Varandey, Russia)
Loading is carried out behind a loading tower with a swivel. This option
improves the direct loading efficiency due to a reduction in the need for
repositioning, since a full circle swivel-loading arm and mooring platform
can be installed [32]. Might be an expensive solution in areas with severe
ice conditions, since the tower design should be able to withstand the
ice loads.
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2. Subsea designs (Figure 10.4)
– Moored Single Anchor Loading (SAL)
The tanker moors on a single line coupled with the loading hose connected
to a single anchor on the seabed [11]. This concept has a limited capability
to resist ice loads, and an effective ice management is absolutely necessary
for its operatibity in severe ice conditions.
– Submerged Turret Loading (STL)
For this concept, the tanker is outfilled with an internal turret. The STL
system protects the top of the loading riser interacting with the ice from
being damaged by moving ice travelling under the hull of the vessel. The
solution minimizes, therefore, the interaction between ice and riser, and
thus the damage risk.
Figure 10.4: Subsea oﬄoading concepts for cold climate conditions. Source: Oil
Spill Solutions
A study comparing the different oﬄoading concepts for the Prirazlomnoye
location, in the Pechora Sea [51], suggests that the different terminal solutions
will have different operational risks associated, presenting the qualitative risk
analysis as in Figure 10.5.
It can be observed that, the armoured STL will present the lowest probability
of accident from all of of the available concepts for cold climate offshore
loading1. The emergency disconnection would avoid hazards in most cases
using this concept. On the other hand, with the use of the wake type solutions,
an emergency disconnection does not reduce the collision hazard with the
structure. Moreover, the SAL concept is extremely vulnerable without an
effective and permanent ice management.
1The arrows represent the reduction in risk with a permanent ice management.
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Figure 10.5: Qualitative risk analysis of the loading concepts for cold climate
offshore terminals. Source: B Bonnemaire, 2006
10.2 Ice Management
Ice management concerns all activities which objective is to reduce or avoid actions
from any kind of ice features. Ice management issues are remarkable for a marine
terminal in a northern location. The identification of potential solutions and
the selection of a feasible ice management approach are essential to ensure safe
year-round operations.
10.2.1 Onshore terminals
Ice may freeze in the quays and structures, or be piled up in front of the terminal
due to the influence of winds, tides and currents, or the action of the berthing vessel
itself. Moreover, uneven accumulations of ice may cause difficulties in maneuvring
if the vessel berthing is unassisted. In addition, the ice growth is accelerated with
the exposure to open water caused by repeated ship passages, compared to an
undisturbed situation [52].
Terminals must remain relatively clear of large floe ice at all times so that
vessels can manoeuvre to the berth. An effective port ice management is, therefore,
essential to ensure safe berthing and loading operations all year round.
The potential ice management schemes for a harbour facility, can be classified
as follows [52]:
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– Ice suppression techniques: inhibiting the formation of ice (Table 10.2).
Table 10.2: Ice suppression techniques
Management Description Reliability and
Technique Effectiveness
Thermal Warm seawater discharged Low cost; technology proven to be
Discharge to the berth side or turning very reliable; minimum expected
area, to avoid ice growth environmental effects
Insulation Presence of a snow cover or Has not been used extensively;
an artificial insulating cover problems with life and application
Bubbler Release of air bubbles at depth Some benefit in delaying ice
Systems to create an upward circulation formation if applied during the
of the warmer water layer early part of the ice season
Enclosure All-weather terminal concept Effective in limiting ice growth
with covered berths to and planning harbour operations;
avoid freezing temperatures high costs; not proven in Arctic
For the LNG terminal proposed at Melville Island in the 1980’s, as part of
the Arctic Pilot Project in the Canadian Arctic, it was concluded that the use
of waste heat in the form of thermal discharge from the liquefaction process,
was the most effective and reliable way to manage the ice near the terminal [52].
– Ice breaking techniques: breaking of ice by bending, crushing or shearing,
to improve vessel access and reduce ice actions on the tanker and berths.
The most common and proven technique for ice management is the use of
icebreaking vessels (Figure 10.6). The icebreaking vessels assist in managing
the ice in the harbour area to facilitate berthing operations, reducing therefore
the possible downtime of the terminal, increasing its regularity. In addition,
the ice actions on the tanker and berths decrease, since the ice floes are
reduced in size. Deflection of moving ice to avoid collision with the loading
tanker, is another important objective of icebreaking vessels in the harbour
area.
It is a well proven concept for ice management with high reliabilities [52]. The
main drawback is generally the high capital, operating and maintenance costs
associated.
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Figure 10.6: Canadian icebreaker "Louis S.st Laurent" at Port Alfred, Canada.
Source: Canadian Coast Guard
The ice management level at a specific harbour, depends mainly on the ice
conditions, but also on the required redundancy and regularity required. The
following classification can be used for the different levels of ice management
[11]:
◦ Sporadic ice management: management needed for specific short term
operations.
◦ Permanent mild ice management: one icebreaker manages the ice to
assist with the loading operations, however the vessel safety at the
terminal should be guaranteed even if the icebreaker stops assisting due
to any unpredicted reason.
◦ Permanent extensive ice management: two or more icebreakers work
assisting the tanker operations.
In addition to breaking the ice upfront the terminal, ice watch is an important
task for icebreakers. For a reliable ice watching system, automated monitoring
of the ice and meteocean conditions is required in addition to ice observers
on board.
– Ice removal techniques: displacement of ice to reduce the interference in
the terminal area (Table 10.3).
92 OFFSHORE FIELD DEVELOPMENT IN COLD CLIMATE
Table 10.3: Ice removal techniques
Management Description Reliability and
Technique Effectiveness
Towing or Ice floes can be towed or Little precedents; requirement
Pushing pushed away by tug/barges for tugs; disposal problems
Dredges & Removal by dredges and transport Little precedents; requirement
Hopper Barges away from the site by barges for tugs; disposal problems
Flow Local high velocity flow by floating Reliable but minimal
Developers units; keep open pools of water local application; small
and broken ice away from berths scale only
Mechanical Conveyors are used to transport Not reliable due to freezing
Transport ice away from the terminal area and breakdown problems
Crushing & Crushed ice is dumped into Effective for ice disposal;
Melting a holding tank of warm water no precedents
10.2.2 Offshore terminals
For an offshore loading concept in ice-infested waters to be operative all year-round,
a proper ice management is essential. The use of icebreakers in support of ice
offshore operations, enables stationary operations in ice. The management necessary
for such ice offshore operations, is substantially different and more demanding than
the traditional ice transit operations or port operations in ice-infested harbours and
terminals [53]. Some of the objectives of ice breakers at offshore terminals are:
– Channeling and assisstance to the tanker in maneouvring, mooring and loading
operations at the terminal.
– Reduction of the actions on the tanker: the incoming ice floes are broken and
therefore reduced in size, turning into rubble.
– Prevention against collision between the loading tanker and large multi-year
ice ridges.
– Reduction of lateral stresses on the tanker by breaking the ice against the
loading tanker.
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Although there are several examples of hydrocarbon transfer in ice-infested
waters, the only experience in year-round offshore loading operations with heavy ice
conditions, is the offshore Varandey terminal in the Pechora Sea [11]. The number
of days with freezing temperatures down to -48℃ is of approximately 240 days
per year; the average duration of ice cover around 247 days, with an ice thickness
between 1.25 and 1.8m [54].
The ice management approach (Figure 10.7) includes a dedicated icebreaker,
Varandey, capable of operating independently in ice conditions, and an icebreaking
standby/supply vessel, Toboy, capable of year-round operation within the area of the
offshore terminal. The functions of the special-purpose vessel Varandey, include ice
channeling for tankers; assisstance in maneuvring, mooring and loading operations
at the offshore terminal; rescue and standby functions; firefighting capability; oil
spill response operations; fulfilling supply functions; and performing underwater
engineering and towing operations in the prevailing ice conditions [55].
Figure 10.7: Tanker approaching Varandey terminal assisted by icebreakers.
Source: Lukoil
The most important development in the physical ice management technology
for ice offshore operations, has been the azimuth thrusters. These can be more
powerful in terms of breaking ice than the hull of an icebreaker. Clearing of the ice
in a highly efficient manner, is an additional benefit. The full potential of using
the azimuth thrusters could be developed by designing and installing them onto
ice offshore platforms, for the purpose of not only propulsion or turning the vessel,
but also for self ice management, increasing therefore the operational efficiency and
safety [53].
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10.3 Spills
Oil harbours and terminals present the threat of accidental releases from storage,
loading operations and potential discharge from pipelines (see Chapter 8 for oil
spill risks, behaviour in cold water environments and response techniques).
To ilustrate the volumes of hydrocarbons stored from examples in cold climate
areas, in the US Arctic, the major oil terminal in Valdez, Alaska, has a current
holding capacity of 8.78 millions bbl in 18 crude oil tanks and two functional loading
berths (Figure 10.8). The crude oil arrives to the terminal through the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline. In Russia, there are crude oil storage facilities at Arkhangelsk and
Figure 10.8: Storage tanks at Valdez terminal, Alaska. Source: Reuters
Mursmansk. Unique to the region is the Varandey terminal in the Pechora Sea. The
Varandey facility includes an onshore tank farm with a capacity of 325000 m3, and
the fixed ice-resistant oil terminal 22km offshore, with a height of 64m. In Norway,
oil from the Skrugard field in the Barents Sea is planned to be brought ashore
at Veidnes terminal in Finnmark. The oil will be transported through a 280km
pipeline from Skrugard to the onshore terminal. The production is estimated at
almost 200000 barrels of oil equivalent per day; 50 to 100 crude oil tankers calling
at the terminal per year.
10.3.1 Onshore terminals
Oil and gas terminals are located in separate harbour basins, not accessible to other
traffic and which can be closed off by floating booms rapidly in case of an accident.
For safety reasons, the surroundings of an onshore terminal or refinery, need to be
protected. Thus, for terminal planning purposes, different safety distances need to
be taken into account.
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In case of oil tanks, the spacing between them is determined by bunds at such
distance that in case of a collapse of the full tank, the oil can be contained within
the bund. Liquid gas storage is more dangerous than oil storage and requires
special need for space due to safety reasons. As a guideline, a LNG terminal with a
throughput of 6 millions m3/year requires, 15 to 20ha for storage, for instance in 4
tanks of 60000 to 80000 m3 [14].
Special precautions have to be taken when dealing with possible oil spills at
harbours during loading/unloading, since any spill would occur in the midst of
broken ice, presenting a more difficult clean-up task. Additional safety measures
may include the restriction of loading rates to limit the size of a spill from a rupture
in the loading arms. For major accidents such a main storage tank failure, the best
defence is to take precautions in planning, design and in operational procedures, in
order to reduce the probability of occurrance to a minimum level.
10.3.2 Offshore terminals
Prevention systems for offshore storage tanks and piping may include use of double-
walled piping, double-walled storage tanks and improved containment structures to
capture and pump recovered fluids before they reach the sea surface [23].
Ice breaking vessels carrying out ice management functions, may also provide
first aid oil spill response. As an example, the Varandey icebreaker, managing the
ice at Varandey offshore terminal, is fitted with a workboat for oil spill response
readiness, which is able to tow an oil boom. The icebreaker has storage for 500 m3
of recovered fluids and is also provided with 20m3 of chemical dispersants to be
applied via spray systems from both sides [55].
The implementation of the future oil spill preparedness for the Goliat offshore
terminal in the Barents Sea (Figure 10.9), will include NOFO20092 systems consist-
ing of a new contingency vessel, Esvagt Aurora, with tank capacity of 1000-2000m3,
400m of heavy offshore boom and skimmer. Oil detecting radar and infrared
cameras will provide the vessel with the ability to operate regardless of darkness
conditions. In addition, a coastal barrier will be implemented with the use of
permanent contingency formed by fishing vessels from Finnmark area. The Goliat
oil spill contingency will also include the capability to use ship based dispersant
systems [56].
2Most recent oil spill contingency standards from the Norwegian Clean Seas Association for
Operating Companies
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Figure 10.9: Simulation of oil spill contingency plan for Goliat field in the Barents
Sea, Norway. Source: Eninorge
10.4 Tanker Operations
The main tanker operations and corresponding limitations are discussed here,
including berthing and (off)loading operations.
10.4.1 Onshore terminals
The complete navigation operation, which ranges from arrival to departure of the
tanker at the terminal, can be divided as follows [16]:
. Arrival at the outer harbour basin
. Berthing: including turning, pre-berthing and mooring operations
. Loading/unloading operations
. Unberthing
. Departure from the harbour basin
Safe vessel approaching and berthing at the terminal, as well as cargo-handling
operations, are essential for the operational availability of the harbour or the berth.
– Visibility and wind restrictions
In addition to ice formation, which needs to be managed at the terminal as
it was reviewed in a previous section, other environmental factors limit the
operability of the tanker berthing and loading at a cold climate harbour.
◦ Visibility
Fog, heavy rain and snow can cause poor visibility (Figure 10.10). Visibil-
ity of more than 2000m can be acceptable for manoeuvring and berthing
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operations inside an oil or gas terminal. However, for reduced visibility
conditions (less than 1000m), it is advised that oil and gas tankers use
tugboat assisstance within the terminal area . As a rule of thumb, most
oil and gas terminals would not be operative for arrival, berthing/un-
berthing and departure of tankers if the visibility is less than 1000m [16].
Figure 10.10: Poor visibility conditions near Melkøya gas terminal, Norway.
Source: Espen Ørud Photography 2012
◦ Wind restrictions
The following limits for wind velocities (Table 10.43), are commonly used
in the evaluation of the mooring system and horizontal forces during
berthing/unberthing of oil tankers and gas carriers at terminals.
Table 10.4: Operational wind limits for oil and gas terminals
Situation Oil terminal Gas terminal
Berthing 10m/s (>150000dwt) 10m/s (LPG >80000m3
15m/s (< 60000dwt) or LNG >137000m3)
12m/s (< 70000dwt)
Loading 20m/s 17m/s
Loading arms 23m/s 20 m/s
disconnection
At berth < 26m/s < 24m/s
Tanker shall >26m/s >24m/s
leave the berth
3Information retrieved from C. Thoresen, 2010
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The risk when taking a gas carrier in ballasted condition to a berth, is
higher than that for an oil tanker. Gas carriers usually have a bigger
freeboard than oil tankers, being therefore more affected by the wind,
with more strict limits applying in those cases. It is recommended to have
instrumentation continuously measuring wind velocities in the vicinity
of oil and gas berths.
– Acceptable wave heights and ship movements
The tanker at berth, may be exposed to different wave directions, and to a
combination of long and short waves as shown in Figure 10.11.
Figure 10.11: Wave combination and directions for a tanker at berth. Source: C.
Thoresen, 2010
The wave configuration is the main responsible for unacceptable ship move-
ments and forces in the mooring system. For large ships such as oil and gas
tankers, the longer periodic waves (T > 20s, 5000 < L(m) < 8000) might
cause serious movements and forces. This introduces the risk of resonance
inside the harbour basin, with long periodic waves having periods of the same
magnitude as the natural period of the moored tankers. If this is the situation,
the ship movement can increase significantly.
The acceptable wave heights and movements of a tanker at a berth will depend
on the elastic properties of the fenders, the type of vessel, the mooring system
of the ship, the method used for loading/unloading, the orientation of the
berth with repect to currents and waves, the wave period and the natural
period of oscillation of the tanker. According to PIANC recommendations
[16], the limiting significant wave heights for different wave directions are
shown in Table 10.5. For higher waves, loading and unloading operations
have to be stopped.
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Table 10.5: Maximum significant wave height at berth
Size of tanker Limiting wave height Hs (m) Limiting wave height Hs (m)
0 ◦ (head on or sted on) 45 ◦ - 90 ◦
< 30 kdwt 1.5 0.8 - 1
30-200 kdwt 1.5 - 2.5 1 - 1.2
> 200 kdwt 2.5 - 3.5 1 - 1.5
These figures, should be always checked against the acceptable ship move-
ments by the loading/unloading systems. Table 10.64 presents the ranges for
maximum allowable movements at berth during loading operations.
Table 10.6: Range for maximum acceptable movements at berth during loading
Type of ship Surge (m) Sway (m) Heave (m) Yaw ( ◦)
Oil tanker ±2 + 0.5 +0.5 1
Gas carrier ±0.2 +0.1 ±0.1 0.5
It can be noticed, that the limits beyond which loading operation is not longer
efficient or safe, vary significantly between an oil tanker and a gas carrier. For
loading/unloading of gas carriers, the movements considered acceptable are
much lower than those for oil tankers.
The evaluation of the ship mooring layout, in charge of safely secure the
tanker to the berth structure, will need to take into account the most severe
combination of wind, waves, currents and ice forces acting on the ship.
10.4.2 Offshore terminals
The loading operation is the most vulnerable marine operation, particularly under
cold climate conditions. The main concerns regarding the operatibity of the terminal
are harsh seas during summer, and ice drift during winter. When operating in ice
covered waters, the offshore terminal is exposed to variable conditions (ice thickness
and varying ice drift and direction), which can pose hazards on the tanker when
connected to the terminal. The worst risk scenarios might be collision between
the tanker and the structure for platform or tower loading, or the rupture of the
mooring or loading line for SAL or STL concepts due to excessive mooring loads
[51]. Thus, the oﬄoading option chosen, as reviewed in section 10.1.2, should be
able to cope with the harsh environmental conditions in a cold climate or Arctic
area. Ice management is likely to be used during all these phases in order to reduce
global and local ice design actions.
4Information retrieved from C. Thoresen, 2010
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The parameters influencing the tanker operatibity at the offshore terminal,
include the tanker design, type of terminal, ice management and ice conditions, being
ice drift the governing parameter in terms of potential downtime at the terminal.
According to the analysis of ice drift measurements at the Prirazlomnoye location,
in the Pechora Sea [51], the different concepts present different vulnerabilities to
ice drift events, downtime rates varying from 6 to 72% depending on the concept
chosen. Figure 10.12 presents the downtime curves for the different oﬄoading
concepts, depending on the minimum loading window necessary for connection to
the terminal, for a full ice management situation.
Figure 10.12: Downtime due to ice drift for different oﬄoading concepts and full
ice management. Source: A. Jensen et al., modified from B. Bonnemaire, 2006
The time needed to load a tanker is approximately 10 hours. It can be observed
that the downtimes associated with loading windows of around 10 hours are sub-
stantial (40 to 70% on average); the loading will be therefore carried out usually
in shorter windows in order to get a good operability rate during winter [51]. The
results show that, under full ice management conditions, direct platform loading
has the lowest performance, the STL concept reaching the best one.
An important requirement for a tanker loading on an offshore loading terminal,
is the possibility of disconnection when operations are foreseen to be unsafed in the
short term. This situation takes place when moving ice becomes stationary. Ice
might start drifting in any direction, increasing rapidly the risks of collision with
the structure and the ice actions. If extremely reliable ice forecasting is performed
at the site, disconnection may not be necessary.
According to a study using North American, Baltic and Russian ship opera-
tional data from vessel approach and mooring at Arctic loading terminals [57], the
analytical models developed concluded that mooring and loading operations are
feasible in both pack ice and landfast ice conditions all year-round with the proper
equipment, ice management and planning.
Part III
Case Studies
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Chapter11Three Fields, Three Solutions
This chapter discusses three different development schemes in the Barents Sea:
Snøhvit, Goliat and Johan Castberg1. The three fields are located nearby (see Figure
11.1), however, they present three different development solutions. In particular,
emphasis will be made on the three offtake solutions and terminals.
Figure 11.1: Location of the three fields considered for the case study analysis.
Source: Statoil
1Former Skrugard Field. Renamed by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on
22nd April 2013
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11.1 Johan Castberg Field Development
11.1.1 Field description and background for choice
The Johan Castberg field is located in the Barents Sea (blocks 7219/9 and 7220/4,5,7).
The location is about 100km north of Snøhvit and 150km north of Goliat (Figure
11.1). The water depth varies between 360-390m depth. The development, at the
moment, includes Skrugard and Havis, two independent structures within the same
licence located 7km one from another. This is a prospective area, with four new
prospects being explored at the moment (Figure 11.2): Nunatak, Skavl, Iskrystall
and a fouth prospect not yet announced (as per May 2013).
Figure 11.2: Johan Castberg field area. Source: Statoil
Johan Castberg is an oil field with some gas. The exploratory drilling results
proved a gas column of 33m and an oil column of 90m for the Skrugard prospect
(7220/8-1), and a 48m gas colum and 128m oil column for the Havis prospect (7220/7-
1) [58]. The total preliminary estimated volumes for these two oil discoveries are
in the range of 400-600 million bbl, with the field scheduled to come on stream in
2018 [9].
1. Physical Environment
The location of the field, high north between 72 − 73 ◦N , presents special
considerations to take into account in terms of harsh climatic conditions
and the special challenges associated. Aspects such as low temperatures,
polar lows, ice, darkness, vulnerable environment and remoteness are specially
aggravated compared to Snøhvit or Goliat, since the location is even more to
the north.
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Figure 11.3 shows the location of the field in relation to the marine icing risk.
The field is located in an area with strongly aggravating gradient of sea spray
icing.
Figure 11.3: Marine icing at the field location. Source: Statoil
Figure 11.4 shows the location of the field in a sea ice probability map. Sea
ice is considered as an accidental/damage condition (ALS), therefore within
the probability 10−4 (red line). The green line, which lies over the field in the
map, corresponds to the 100 year probability of occurrance (10−2).
Figure 11.4: Sea ice at the field location. Source: Statoil
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Regions where collision between icebergs and an installation can occur with
an annual probability of exceedance of 10−2 and 10−4 in the Barents Sea, are
shown in Figure 11.5. Both limits, the 100 year and 10000 year limits for the
likelihood of southward penetration by icebergs have been estimated in the
Norsok N-003 industry standard [59]. The Johan Castberg field lies within
the 10000 year limit, probability of occurrance 10−4 (dotted line). The solid
line shows the limit for the probability of exceedance of 10−2.
Figure 11.5: Limit for collision with icebergs at the field location. Source: Modified
from NORSOK N-003
It can be observed that the field location is placed at low level probability
for both sea ice and iceberg collision. The ALS requirement governs the
design, corresponding with an annual exceedance probability for both events
set to 10−4. The consequences of sea ice and icebergs at low level probability,
depend on the concept chosen. The structural layout should be selected so as
to limit the consequences. For instance, particular attention should be paid
to protecting critical components such as risers [59]. As it would be explained
later on, the concept chosen includes a subsea production system tied in to a
floating installation. These elements should be, thus, designed to account for
the ALS requirement for impact events.
2. Alternative Concepts for the Development
The alternatives considered for the field development (see Figure 11.6), include:
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– Floater Alternatives: subsea production system on the seabed and
processing of the well stream carried out at a floating platform (FPSO
platform or vessel). The oil would be exported to market using tankers
which would be loaded at the offshore platform (solution as chosen for
Goliat).
– Oil pipeline to shore: subsea production system on the seabed tied
up to a floating production unit with first stage separation and with a
pipeline to an onshore terminal where final processing and storage of the
oil are held. The oil is then shiped to the market by tankers loaded at
the harbour.
Figure 11.6: Johan Castberg field development alternatives. Source: Statoil
3. Final Development Solution
The development concept chosen for the area, is the oil pipeline to shore
option (Figure 11.7). The infraestructure is common for Skrugard and Havis,
and possibly for new prospects in the area, and includes the following elements
[9]:
– Subsea production system located at 380m of water depth and tied in to
a floating installation.
– Floating installation consisting of a semi-submersible floating unit. Water
will be processed out and gas reinjected.
– Pipeline of 280km length transporting oil from the field to an onshore
terminal.
– Onshore terminal at Veidnes, Finnmark, where the oil will be processed
and stored in two mountain caverns.
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– Transportation to the market by tankers arriving at the terminal harbour
for loading. 50 to 100 crude tankers are estimated to call at the terminal
each year.
Figure 11.7: Development concept chosen for Johan Castberg field. Source:
Statoil
The reasons for this concept choice are related mainly to the location of the
field at a very high latitude, and also to the possibility of further exploration
and future discoveries in the area.
– High Latitude Location (72− 73 ◦N)
The location of the field, further north than Goliat or Snøhvit, accen-
tuates the challenges that are imposed due to the climatic conditions.
Colder environment, potentially considerably more icing and sea ice risk,
darkness, remoteness etc., increase the technical and operational risks,
especially offshore. The concept chosen, avoids offshore storage and
oﬄoading, therefore decreasing the technical risk and the production
downtime. Economically, the offshore costs are reduced, which is of
extreme importance in cold climate locations, on the other hand, an
investment in the terminal is added in this case.
– Further exploration and future discoveries
Due to the high potential of future discoveries in the area, this concept
facilitates further exploration and helps make future discoveries profitable
in the area due to its flexibility to include prospecive resources. Future
new discoveries in the area could be tied in to the Veidnes oil terminal.
11.1.2 Terminal concept and breakwater assessment
The project for the planned onshore terminal operated by Statoil, as part of the
Skrugard field development, is in a relatively early stage at the moment (as per
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June 2013). Information from the screening study for the site selection process of
the terminal has been provided, Courtesy of Statoil, as support for this part of the
Master thesis.
The alternative locations for the terminal, included five different locations in
Finnmark area (see Figure 11.8), including the current plant at Melkøya.
Figure 11.8: Alternative locations for the onshore terminal for the Johan Castberg
field. Source: Courtesy of Statoil
The final location for the terminal will be Veidnes, outside Honningsvåg. Figure
11.9 shows the exact location of the terminal area. Meteocean information (100
year return period) for Veidnes area, is included in Appendix B (Figure B.3). It
can be observed that the location chosen is well sheltered from waves, with a 100
year return period significant wave height from wind waves of HS = 2.2m and peak
period Tp = 6.2s. It is important to notice that although sea ice is not likely to
occur, there is a high/extreme icing risk at Veidnes.
An assessment has been carried out for the stability of a potential breakwater
protecting the onshore terminal at Veidnes. The required armour stone mass for
a conventional rubble mound and a berm breakwater has been calculated using
different formulations available. A comparison of the different armour unit masses is
presented here. The detailed formulations, meteocean data and calculations carried
out, are presented in Appendix B.
i Rubble mound breakwater
For the stability of a conventional rubble mound breakwater, Hudson (B.1)
and Van der Meer (B.2), (B.3) formulations have been used. The parameters
110 OFFSHORE FIELD DEVELOPMENT IN COLD CLIMATE
Figure 11.9: Onshore terminal location and preliminary layout. Source: Courtesy
of Statoil
employed in the calculations and their justification are presented in Appendix
B.
Table 11.1 shows the required stone mass and size for a rubble mound breakwa-
ter concept, after calculations using Hudson and Van der Meer formulations.
Table 11.1: Required armour stone mass for a rubble mound breakwater concept
at Veidnes, using Hudson and Van der Meer formulations. HS = 2.24m, Tz = 8.06s,
slope 1:1.5.
Formulation W50 (tons) D50 (m)
Hudson (B.1) 1.2 0.80
Van der Meer (B.2), (B.3) 3.2 1.1
start of damage S = 2
Van der Meer (B.2), (B.3) 1.6 0.85
near failure S = 6
Here W50 and D50 represent median armour stone mass and diameter respec-
tively. S represents the damage level.
Hudson formulation is still used for conceptual design due to its simplicity.
However, important parameters, for instance the wave period, are not taken
into account. In addition to the parameters in the Hudson formula, Van der
Meer formulation takes into account the storm duration, the wave period,
the damage level, the permeability and the type of breaking. However, the
formulation is based on curve fitting, with no other physical meaning than the
stability number (H0), which can be recognized in formulas (B.2) and (B.3).
The necessary armour stone mass has been plotted as a function of the
Iribarren number (see Appendix B for formulation). The Iribarren number
CHAPTER 11: THREE FIELDS, THREE SOLUTIONS 111
varies with the slope angle and the wave period. The results can be represented
for different wave periods, and therefore, Hudson and Van der Meer results
can be compared (Figures B.4, B.5).
For the mean wave period caculated at the location Tz = 8.06s (Appendix B),
the Iribarren number is ξz = 4.5, which corresponds with the surging wave
case (see Figure 11.10, red line). For that Iribarren number, Van der Meer
formulation gives a required armour stone mass W50 = 3.2t, while Hudson
formula, for KD = 4 (KD is a coefficient obtained from model tests of the
required W50) and H = HS , gives W50 = 1.2t, as summarized in Table 11.1.
The results show a difference of around 2 tons depending on the formulation
employed. However, it is important to notice that the evaluation of the
mean wave period introduces some uncertainty. Therefore, a range should
be defined for the expected mean wave period. In this case, a range between
Tz = 6− 10s has been defined. In that case, the Iribarren number (Appendix
B, equation (B.3)) would be in the range of ξz = 3.4−5.5, varying between the
plunging and surging cases. The required stone mass would be approximately
W50 = 2.5t for a period Tz = 10s or W50 = 2.2t for a period Tz = 6s (see
Figure 11.11).
Figure 11.10: Necessary armour stone mass vs Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 2; slope 1:1.5; permeability coefficient P = 0.4; non-breaking waves;
HS = 2.24m; N = 3000 (corresponding to ca. 9 hours sea state), Tz = 8.06s.
The results for a higher damage level (S = 6) are presented in Appendix B.
It can be concluded that due to the protected location of the harbour, and
the relatively low wave heights at the site, the required armour stone mass
for these given conditions and a conventional rubble mound breakwater, is
relatively small; stone size that should be accessible from rock quarries in the
area.
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Figure 11.11: Necessary armour stone mass vs Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 2; slope 1:1.5; permeability coefficient P = 0.4; non-breaking waves;
HS = 2.24m; N = 3000; Tz = 6− 10s.
ii Berm breakwater
The stability of a berm breakwater concept has also been assessed. In this
case, the stability number (H0) and the period stability number (H0T0) have
been used as mobility criteria for the calculation of the required armour stone
mass. The values obtained, correspond to the main armour class, the rocks
that would only be placed in the most exposed part of the cross section. See
Appendix B for detailed calculations.
The maximum stone size calculated from the stability number (Table B.1)
and from the period stability number (Table B.2) are compared to obtain the
upper limits that are selected as final requirement for the maximum stone
size for a berm breakwater concept at Veidnes. Table 11.2 shows the final
requirements to the stone size.
Table 11.2: Final requirement for maximum stone size for a berm breakwater
concept at Veidnes. HS = 2.24m; Tz = 8.06s
Category W50 (tons) D50 (m)
Non-reshaping ≈ 1.1 0.75
Reshaping, static stable ≈ 0.70 0.65
Although both types, non-reshaping and reshaping static stable types are
presented, the reshaping type in this case would not be a safe option to take
into account since the stone size is already very small, and the reshaping
could potentially cause an unsafe situation.
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It can be observed that the required mass for the main armour class is in this
case W50 = 1.1t for the Icelandic type, which is very close to the W50 = 1.2t
required for the conventional rubble mound calculated by using Hudson
formula.
Sea ice has not been considered in any of the calculations since the meteocean
information shows that it is not likely to occur at the site (Figure B.3).
Summarizing, the location chosen for the onshore terminal at Veidnes, is well
protected and sheltered, presenting relatively mild wave conditions, with a
design significant wave height ofHS = 2.24m and a peak period Tp = 6.2s. For
low wave heights, HS < 3m, usually conventional rubble mound breakwaters
are chosen as design option [44], and a berm breakwater would probably not
be the most economic solution in a case like this.
11.2 Snøhvit Field Development
11.2.1 Field description and background for choice
The Snøhvit field is the first offshore project in the Barents Sea, without surface
installations, and also comprises the first LNG production and export facility in
Europe. The field is located on the Norwegian Continental Shelf at 71 ◦N , in the
Barents Sea (blocks 7120 and 7121). The location is approximately 150km offshore,
where the water depth varies between 310-340m (Figure 11.12). The area includes
three different fields: Askeladd, Albatros and Snøhvit, all of them parts of the
Snøhvit LNG field development project. There is a total of 20 wells, one injection
well for CO2 and 19 production wells which are producing gas from those three
fields. Snøhvit and Albatros wells came on stream in 2007. The Askeladd field of
the development is due to come on stream in 2014-2015 [9], [58].
Snøhvit is a gas field with condensate and an underlying oil zone. The reservoirs
contain gas, condensate and oil in Lower and Middle Jurasic sandstones of the
Stø and Nordmela Formations. The reservoir depth is approximately 2300m. The
recovery strategy is pressure depletion, not including recovery of the oil zone. The
original recoverable reserves include 176.7 billion Sm3 of gas, 6.4 million tonnes of
NGL and 22.6 million Sm3 of condensate [58].
The alternative concepts considered for the field development included:
i Processing out the water on a platform and sending the rich gas to shore.
ii Full wellstream sent to shore and gas treatment at an onshore terminal.
iii Subsea processing and rich gas sent to shore. This option is not yet technically
available, but it will possibly be a feasible option from 2015.
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Figure 11.12: Snøhvit field area. Source: Modified from Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate
The final development concept chosen for the area was the option of a full
unprocessed wellstream to shore through a 143km long pipeline to the onshore
terminal at Melkøya for processing and export (Figure 11.13):
– Remotely-operated subsea installation located at 340m of water depth.
– Pipeline transport to the onshore facility at Melkøya through a 143km multi-
phase flow line.
– 153km pipeline for CO2 reinjection from the Hammerfest LNG plant back to
the Snøhvit field.
– LNG plant and terminal at Melkøya island, Hammerfest, where the gas is
liquified and shipped out mainly to Europe and US.
– Transportation of LNG, LPG and condensate to the market by tankers arriving
at the terminal harbour for loading. Around 70 LNG carriers and 10 LPG
carriers call at the terminal each year.
Some of the main challenges related to the development chosen for the Snøhvit
field include:
– Nothern Location (70 ◦N)
The climatic factors associated with the nothern location of the field represent
several challenges for the design, construction and operating lifetime of the
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Figure 11.13: Development concept chosen for Snøhvit field. Source: Statoil
development. Although the Gulf Stream keeps the sea free of ice year round,
polar low pressures represent one of the main issues since they could change
the weather suddenly, causing operation disruptions. As an example, the
frequency of polar lows passing Melkøya during the last 20 years has been
approximately one polar low every second year, suddenly increasing the mean
wind speed to more than 25m/s [60]. In addition, high waves caused by winter
storms make surface installations diffcult to operate in these conditions. The
main advantage of a complete subsea installation on the seabed for this type
of cold climate is that it allows a steady and stable production, unaffected by
the temperature and conditions on the surface.
Moreover, the ambient conditions on the onshore terminal are very important
during the plant operation. One of the main issues affecting the onshore
facilities at Melkøya is the extreme risk of icing of equipment and facilities
at the LNG plant. The plant suffered heavy icing during the winter of 2002
(Figure 11.14), with an ice growth rate in the order of 30cm in an area 25m
away from the shoreline during 48 hours [60].
– Transport challenges
The transport of unprocessed wellstream, through such a long seabed pipeline,
poses several challenges. Due to low temperature and high pressure on the
seabed, ice plugs tend to form in the pipeline. Hydrate control is therefore
of extreme importance in this type of development. Various hydrate control
solutions exist. The selection of hydrate control scheme is normally based on
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Figure 11.14: Icing of facilities at Melkøya during winter 2002. Source: M. A.
Drage et al. 2003 [59]
a life cycle cost comparison between different solutions. In this case, hydrate
formation is avoided by continuous MEG injection and heating up of the
pipeline electrically when required [9].
11.2.2 Terminal concept and breakwater assessment
The island of Melkøya was the selected location for the construction of the LNG
plant for the Snøhvit gas field. The function of the plant is to liquify gas from the
Snøhvit gas field for export by LNG and LPG gas carriers to Europe and US.
Firstly, a slug catcher links the offshore and onshore systems by taking the
fluid from the pipe. Then the gas must be dried by removing water, MEG and
condensate. In addition, the Snøhvit gas contains 5-6% CO2 which freezes at a
higher temperature than natural gas, so it must be also removed before the gas
is cooled into LNG. This carbon dioxide removed from the wellstream is returned
offshore and reinjected into the reservoir. Then methane is converted to LNG
by cooling it down to -163℃. Moreover, propane and butane are also liquefied
by refrigeration at -50℃ to get LPG, which is stored in dedicated tanks before
shipment. Figure 11.15 shows the detailed diagram for the processing at the plant.
The plant is protected by a berm breakwater with a top level of +12m. The
initial design was a dynamically stable berm breakwater, design that was changed
afterwards for the final Icelandic berm breakwater. The breakwater is therefore
designed as a statically stable non-reshaping berm structure for the 100 years return
period, significant wave height HS = 7.5m and peak wave period Tp = 15.6s. The
design should also withstand a 1000 years return period wave without structural
damage (HS = 8.5m, Tp = 17s) [61].
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Figure 11.15: Block flow diagram of processing at Melkøya. Source: Statoil
The cross section of the most exposed part of the breakwater protecting the
LNG plant, and the stone classes used are presented in Figure 11.16. It can be
observed that the armour stone mass goes up to 35 tonnes at the most exposed
locations.
Figure 11.16: Cross section of the most exposed part of the Melkøya breakwater
and corresponding stone classes. Source: S. Sigurdarson et al., 2005
The reasons for choosing an Icelandic design aimed to optimize the structure
with respect to wave load, usage of rock yield and construction equipment. Moreover,
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during stability tests of the preliminary dynamically stable design, heavy green
water overtopping occurred, and large rocks from the armour layer were carried
over the top to the industrial area, a situation clearly unacceptable. The design was
therefore modified to an Icelandic type aiming to reduce overtopping and increase
stability using a less voluminous structure. Taking into account the nothern location
of the breakwater where icing from accumulation of frozen sea spray may represent
significant difficulties for the plant structures and facilities, wave overtopping
reduction was an important factor in the choice of this type of structure.
As an exercise, the necessary armour stone mass has been calculated for a
conventional rubble mound breakwater at the site, using Hudson and Van der Meer
formulations for a slope 1:1.5. See Appendix B for the detailed parameters used
in the calculations. The results are shown in Figure 11.17, in which the necessary
armour mass has been plotted as a function of the Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 2, start of damage (see Appendix B for a higher damage level of S = 6).
For a mean wave period of Tz = 20.3s, the Iribarren number is ξz = 6.1. For
this Iribarren number, the Van der Meer formula gives a required armour stone
mass W50 ≈ 83t, while the Hudson formula gives a required stone mass W50 ≈ 44t.
Figure 11.17: Necessary armour stone mass vs Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 2; slope 1:1.5; permeability coefficient P = 0.4; non-breaking waves;
HS = 7.5m; N = 3000, Tz = 20.3s.
If the mean wave period is expected to be in the range of Tz = 18− 22s, the
Iribarren number varies in the range of ξz = 5.5− 6.7, still in the surging wave case.
In general, the required armour stone mass for these conditions is so large that it
would not be possible to obtain large enough stones from rock quarries. In this case,
alternatives such as concrete armour units or the actual chosen berm breakwater
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concept with rock units are good alternative solutions.
Table 11.3 shows a summary of the results for the required armour unit mass
of the actual Melkøya berm breakwater in addition to the required mass for a
conventional two layer rubble mound breakwater using rock, cubes and tetrapods,
slope 1:1.5 and a start of damage level S = 2. See Appendix B for details.
Table 11.3: Comparison of armour unit masses for different concepts at Melkøya
breakwater. HS = 7.5m; Tz = 20.3s; slope 1:1.5; two layer armour stones for the
different rubble mounds.
Berm Rubble Mound
breakwater rocks rocks concrete tetrapods
Hudson Van der Meer cubes
≈W50 (t) 13 (H0 = 2.7) 44 83 30 15
33 (H0 = 2)
The results presented in Table 11.3 indicate that it would have not been possible
to build a conventional rubble mound breakwater at Melkøya, with a reasonable
slope, from quarried stone for the wave conditions at the site. If a conventional
rubble mound would have been still required, concrete armour units may have been
used. However, the mass of the concrete elements needs to be larger than the mass
of the rock units in the berm breakwater 2. Thus, if good quality rocks of the
required size are available, the berm breakwater concept would be the preferred
option, as it was the actual final design built at Melkøya.
11.3 Goliat Field Development
11.3.1 Field description and background for choice
The Goliat field is located on the Norwegian Continental Shelf at 71 ◦N , in the
Barents Sea (block 7122/7,8,10,11). The location is approximately 50km southeast
of the Snøhvit field. The water depth varies between 360-420m (Figure 11.18),
and the area includes two separate main reservoirs: the Kobbe and Realgrunnen
formations [62], [58].
The Goliat reservoirs contain oil and thin gas caps. The reservoir depth is 1100
to 1800m in a complex and segmented structure. The pressure in the reservoirs is
low (123bar for Realgrunnen and 192bar for Kobbe). The recovery strategy consists
2Notice that the upper stability criteria for reshaped static stable (H0 = 2.7) needs to be used
in order to compare the different types of breakwaters. The non-reshaped threshold (H0 = 2)
would define only the larger stone class. However, the weighted stability number for all stone
classes of the most exposed cross section, results in a statically stable structure.
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Figure 11.18: Goliat field area. Source: Eni Norge
on using water injection as pressure support. Associated gas will be reinjected back
until a possible export solution for the gas is available, for instance through the
Snøhvit pipeline to Melkøya. The original recoverable reserves include 30.2 million
Sm3 of oil, 7.3 billion Sm3 of gas and 0.3 million tonnes of NGL [58].
The alternative concepts considered (Figure 11.19) for the field development
included [63]:
– Offshore processing and oil storage: subsea production system and
processing of the well stream carried out at a floating platform (in addition
to a standard FPSO, SEMO3 and Sevan4 designs have been evaluated). The
oil is exported to the market using tankers which are loaded at the offshore
platform.
– Offshore processing and onshore oil storage: subsea production system
tied up to a semisubmersible unit with first stage separation and with a
pipeline to an onshore terminal where final processing and storage of the
oil are held. The oil is then shiped to the market by tankers loaded at the
harbour.
– Onshore processing and storage: full well stream sent to shore for pro-
cessing at an onshore terminal. Gas and water pipelines back to the field
from the onshore terminal for reinjection into the reservoirs.
3Monofloater design, geostationary FPSO.
4FPSO design with a cylindrical hull. The hull is used for cargo storage and segregated ballast
tanks, as well as for marine and utility systems.
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Figure 11.19: Goliat field development alternatives. Source: Eni Norge
The final development concept chosen for the area is offshore processing, storage
and oﬄoading (Figure 11.20). The infraestructure includes the following elements
[62]:
– Subsea installation located at 350-400m water depth. It includes 22 subsea
wells in 8 of 4-slot templates. Eleven of these wells will be producers, 9
water injectors and 2 gas injectors. The southernmost template is located
approximately 7km from the FPSO.
– Cylindrical production facility (Sevan 1000 FPSO). At the floating platform,
the wellstream will be processed and the oil will be stored and oﬄoaded to
tankers. The platform counts on winterization systems to operate under the
subarctic conditions at the location. The oﬄoading from the FPSO to the
shuttle tankers can be carried out around the entire circumference of the
platform (see next section for details of the solution).
– Reinjection of produced gas in addition to sea water in order to attain the
total pressure drive necessary to achieve optimal production. Later gas export
is being evaluated.
– Power supplied from land via a subsea electric cable, combined with an
onboard power generation system
– Transportation of oil through shuttle tankers that will call at Goliat on a
weekly basis to collect 850000 bbl from the FPSO.
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– Operation of a contingency vessel on permanent station in the area equipped
for mechanical oil recovery and dispersal operations. The vessel is provided
with winterization systems, oil detecting radar and infrared cameras for
operation under cold and dark conditons.
Figure 11.20: Development concept chosen for Goliat field. Source: Eni Norge
In this case, taking into account the location of the field, further south than
Johan Castberg, the challenges imposed due to the climatic conditions are lowered,
which potentially decreases the technical and operational offshore risks at the
location, making offshore processing, storage and oﬄoading a feasible and less
expensive solution, for instance avoiding investment in a terminal or providing
opportunity for tie-ins in case of other discoveries in the area.
However, the severe climate conditions and sensitivity of the environment due
to the nothern and relatively close to shore location of the field, make oil spill
protection and contingency measures of extreme importance in order to minimize
the environmental risks. The location of the Goliat field means that any oil spill
might potentially affect the coast. In order to prevent accidents in severe climate
conditions during oil and gas production, it is necessary to develop specific technical
and emergency reponse systems [11]. Some of the special requirements and new
solutions that will be applied to the Goliat preparedness system are as follows [64]:
– Sensors on subsea templates combined with inspections using a remotely
operated vehicle in order to ensure an early warning in case of any error.
– Standby vessel stationed by the production unit. The vessel has been optimized
for cold climate and winter conditions.
– FPSO design to reduce the probability of acute pollution (see next section).
The production unit will have sensors and flow meters monitoring the discharge
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points. In addition, it will count with onboard infrared cameras to detect and
monitor any oil spill independent of lighting conditions.
– Infrared radar surveillance of the area integrated into helicopters, aircraft and
other vessels participating in the emergency response plan.
– Permanent preparedness organization in cooperation with regional fishermans
and NOFO. Fishing vessels from Finnmark will carry light and medium weight
boom systems.
11.3.2 Terminal concept and offshore loading
The offshore solution chosen for the Goilat field, is based on a cylindrical FPSO. This
type of geostationary FPSO, presents some differences compared to a shipshaped
FPSO or a semisubmersible unit, making it a potentially advantageous offshore
option when the harsh and subarctic environment at the field location is taken into
account [65], [62].
– The main difference between the geostationary FPSO and ordinary production
vessels, is that it faces the environment with the same shape in all directions,
therefore, there is no need to rotate and thus avoids the often costly turret and
swivel system. This implies also less maintenance costs and risk of downtime.
Moreover, the floating cylindrical structure has no bow or stern. This enhances
the safety zone around the unit because it is not turned by the sea or wind,
potentially reducing the environmental risks.
– Due to the global stresses on the hull, the bending stresses are insignificant
[65], eliminating typical wave induced fatigue loads and deflections between
modules (Figure 11.21). This results in stability under harsh water conditions.
Figure 11.21: Comparison of hull stresses for different platform types. Source:
Sevan Marine
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– Low heave and roll/pitch motions allow a high operability.
– Accomodates a large number of risers, and the posibility for future tie-ins
through low investment costs.
– The processing carried out at the platform includes the following modules:
manifold and pigging, separation, gas compression/recompression and water
system chemical injection. The total liquid processing capacity is 17500
Sm3/day.
– Winterization is required. The winterization strategy includes a protective
shielding of exposed areas, safe areas fully enclosed as far as possible, heat
tracing on relevant surfaces, process area covered by a protective wall with
overlapping plates and a fully enclosed roof structure. Specifically, the process
area is protected by winterization panels, which are transparent allowing
sufficient air flow to satisfy natural ventilation of the process area [65].
– The FPSO unit is constructed with double base and hull.
– Electricity will be supplied from land via a subsea electric cable (108km,
75MW), combined with energy generated onboard the facility (additional
20-30MW) to ensure operability in case of problems with electricity supply
from land.
Table 11.4 shows the main dimensions of the FPSO for the Goliat field.
Table 11.4: Main dimensions Goliat FPSO.
Storage Displacement Diameter Deck area Topside
(bbl) (mt) (m) (m2) weight (tons)
Hull Main Process Tanktop Process
deck deck deck deck
1000000 180000 90 102 107 8170 8990 25000-30000
Oﬄoading system
A new, improved concept will be used for oﬄoading oil from the Goliat FPSO
and loading onto tankers. The new system makes it possible for a potentially safer
and efficient oﬄoading by introducing an extended loading positioning sector for
tankers loading from the cylindrical FPSO. The reduced oﬄoading risk is mainly
due to [65]:
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– Significant reduced collision risk compared to a conventional oﬄoading from
a weathervaning FPSO.
– The geostationary hull presents favourable motion characteristics and mooring
safety, leading to less motion interference with the tanker.
– Larger operational window.
Having a look at the North Sea experience, there have been several collisions during
oﬄoading operations in the past. In the last 15 years, tanker collision in tandem
oﬄoading has occurred on Emerald FSU, Gryphon FPSO, Norne FPSO, Njord
FSU and Captain FPSO [65]. This shows the high risk of the offshore loading
activity. The goal of this new oﬄoading system is the reduction of collision risk by
an improved system in which the operation envelope and separation distance have
been increased.
The governing criteria for the tanker loading is the distance from the floating
unit and heading away from the FPSO (Figure 11.22).
Figure 11.22: Tanker positioning requirements and limitations. Source: Eni
Norge
The following requirements and limitations apply [63]:
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– The shuttle tanker should usually operate with 50m heading offset to the
FPSO.
– The tanker should not head towards the FPSO when connected. Heading
toward the FPSO is only allowed during change of the tanker´s heading from
one side of the FPSO to the other.
– Typical operating distance between the shuttle tanker bow and the FPSO is
approximately 250m
– Minimum distance between the shuttle tanker and the FPSO is 150m.
– Minimum distances between the tanker bow manifold and the closest riser
and mooring line are 50m and 20m respectively.
– A restricted operation area in the secondary oﬄoading station.
– Tankers are equiped with a dedicated Dynamically Positioned system in
continuous operation.
The operating sector is therefore 240+190 degrees (overlapping sectors), through
a primary and secondary oﬄoading stations. The wave height limit for tanker hook
up and loading is HS = 4.5− 5.5m. Figure 11.23 shows the significant wave height
data at the FPSO location. It can be observed that the main direction of incidence
is west-southwest.
Figure 11.23: Significant wave height data at Goliat field. Source: Eni Norge
According to a risk assessment on collision and accidental drive off carried out by
Scandpower and Sevan [66], the collision risk with the cylindrical FPSO is shown to
be reduced by a factor of 250 compared to traditional tandem oﬄoading. The main
contributors are the increased stability of the geostationary hull and the tanker
bow not pointing at the FPSO.
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Figure 11.24 shows the collision risk comparison between direct oﬄoading from
a geostationary FPSO and tandem oﬄoading from a shipshaped FPSO.
Figure 11.24: Collision risk comparison of tandem vs direct oﬄoading. Source:
Sevan

Chapter12Risk Assessment
This chapter discusses qualitative risk analysis tools for use during assessment of
hydrocarbon field developments. Generally, a qualitative analysis is carried out
before any quantitative, more sophisticated analysis is employed.
The methodology described here, will be applied to the three case studies: Johan
Castberg, Snøhvit and Goliat field developments, for identification and evaluation
of the main risks involved.
The risk concept is used as a measure of safety, and can be defined as the
product of probability and consequence of a potential undesired event (Figure 12.1).
Risk = Probability × Consequence
– Probability: likelihood of a potential event. Expressed in the range of 0 to 1,
zero meaning the certainty that the event will not occur, and 1 means the
certainty that the event will occur.
– Consequence: severity of negative impact if the unwanted event occurs.
Figure 12.1: Hazard bow-tie diagram. Source: Aker Kværner
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Generally, a risk assessment comprises the following steps [67], [68]:
– Risk acceptance criteria: sets the criteria before carrying out the assess-
ment.
– Identification of the potential hazards: factors such as properties of
the substances being handled, arrangement of the equipment, operating
and maintenance procedures, processing conditions, leakages and explosions,
extreme environmental conditions, ship collision, etc. are considered at this
first stage.
– Assessment of the risk: evaluates the probabilities and consequences of
such hazards taking into account their tolerability to personnel, the infras-
tructure or the environment.
– Acceptability of the risk: evaluates the estimated risks against the risk
acceptance criteria appropriate to the situation, which should be defined prior
to the risk analysis.
12.1 Acceptance Criteria and Qualitative Risk Matrix
The acceptance criteria expresses the risk level that is considered tolerable for the
activity in question. The definition of the acceptable risk levels should be decided
prior to the risk analysis, and it is usually determined as regulatory requirements,
company policy, public opinion, customer requirements and satisfying economic
constraints [67].
The most common framework used for risk criteria, widely adopted in marine
risk assessments, divides the risks into three categories [69], [70]. See Figure 12.2.
– Unacceptable: risks are intolerable except in extraordinary circumstances,
whatever their benefits. Risk reduction measures need to be implemented,
otherwise the operation shall not be carried out.
– Tolerable: risks that are tolerated to secure the benefits generated. The As
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)1 principle is applied. Risk reducing
measures are required to ensure performance of the operations within an
acceptable risk level. The risk is tolerable only if reduction cost exceeds
improvement achieved or is disproportionate to the benefits gained.
– Broadly acceptable: risks considered insignificant by the majority, and
therefore regarded as acceptable. Action to reduce those risks is usually not
required, however, the ALARP principle can be applied to ensure that the risk
remains at this level and/or reduced further if reasonably practical. Usually,
1The ALARP principle is that the residual risk should be As Low As Reasonably Practicable.
Risk reducing measures are feasible and their costs are not larger than the benefits.
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for the definition of the negligible risk level, below wich the risk is considered
acceptable, cost-benefit anlysis are used to evaluate the effect of risk reducing
measures.
Figure 12.2: Tolerability of risk framework. Source: HSE
For qualitative assessments, is possible to use a risk matrix to compare options
and the value of risk reducing measures. The results are expressed in the form of
a two dimensional matrix, with the probability of occurrence on one axis and the
consequences on the other. This arrangement may be a suitable expression of risk,
specially for early project phases. The matrix is usually divided into three categories,
which can be compared to the acceptance criteria previously defined.
– Low risk - Acceptable (A): risk management for continued improvement.
– Medium risk - Satisfactory (S): risk reduction based on ALARP principle.
– High risk - Unacceptable (U): risk reduction, high management attention
and detailed assessment is necessary.
For ranking and evaluation of the risks, a 5x5 risk matrix has been defined
(Figure 12.3) for this analysis, taking as indication the risk matrix presented in the
International Standard ISO 17776 [68], the assessment criteria used for oil companies
in Norway, adopted from the OLF MIRA 2 guideline, and the recommended practice
by Det Norske Veritas for risk management of marine and subsea operations [70].
The consequences have been defined to apply to four categories: people, environ-
ment, assets and company reputation. The red color shows the high risk situations,
2The Norwegian Oil Industry Association. Method for Environmental Risk Analysis
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which correspond with an unacceptable risk (U); yellow cells show the medium risk
situations, which correspond to a satisfactory risk level (S); green cells show the
low or acceptable risk situations (A).
Figure 12.3: Risk matrix used for the analysis.
12.2 Hazard Identification and Risks Reduction
A hazard can be defined as a potential source of harm. Several methods are available
for the identification of hazards, some of them are briefly described below [70], [71].
– Hazard Identification Analysis (HAZID)
This technique is used to identify and evaluate hazards early in a project.
The method is used as a tool for assessing the potential risks the operation
initially represents.
– Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
It is an interdisciplinary, systematic approach to identify risky operations and
weaknesses in procedures.
– Design Review (DR)
It is a systematic approach to review a particular design solution and is
used to reveal weaknesses in the design of a particular system, structure or
component.
– Failure Modes, Effects and Critically Analysis (FMECA)
This method is used to identify potential failure modes of each functional
block in a system, and to study the effects those failures might have on the
system.
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– Semi Quantitative Risk Analysis (SQRA)
The main purpose of the SQRA is to subjectively assess the risk and criti-
cality of operations in order to identify the most critical activities. A semi-
quantitative risk assessment, may be used in combination or as a part of
other of the previously defined hazard review techniques (HAZID, HAZOP,
FMECA, etc.).
As an initial tool, a HAZID can be used to identify the main areas of concern
and what are the typical design drivers. Here, brief HAZIDs have been prepared
for each of the three case studies (see next section).
After the potential hazards have been identified and the risks estimated, the
evaluation of risk reducing measures is carried out. Risk reduction measures should
include those to prevent incidents (i.e. reduce the probability of occurrence), to
control incidents (i.e. limit the extent and duration of a hazardous situation) and
to mitigate the effects (i.e. reduce the consequences). The general hierarchy for
risk reducing measures is as follows:
i Prevention to avoid the hazard
ii Elimination of the cause of the hazard
iii Technical action to reduce the probability of the hazard.
iv Technical action to reduce the consequences of the hazard
v Operational actions to reduce the hazard
12.3 Case Studies Application
In this section, the main potential hazards and their effects have been identified
for each of the three case studies. Figures 12.4, 12.5 and 12.6 show the HAZIDs
generated for Johan Castberg, Snøhvit and Goliat respectively. For the identification
of the main hazards and assessment of possible effects, the hazards checklist provided
by the International Standard ISO 17776 [68] has been used. The probability and
consequence upon the four categories (people, environment, assets and reputation)
have been estimated and ranked, i.e. describing the risk as low, medium or high,
following the criteria explained in the previous section.
After the identification of hazards and the estimation of risks, the higher risk
activities have been placed in the 5x5 risk matrix (Figure 12.7).
The Goliat field presents several hazardous situations related to offshore storage
and oﬄoading of hydrocarbons, especially if the northern location of the field and
the proximity to the coast are taken into account. Comparing the chosen solution
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Figure 12.4: HAZID for Johan Castberg field.
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Figure 12.5: HAZID for Snøhvit field.
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Figure 12.6: HAZID for Goliat field.
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Figure 12.7: Higher risk hazards located in the defined 5x5 qualitative risk matrix
before the application of risk reducing measures.
for Johan Castberg in terms of risks with an offshore processing and oil storage
solution (as chosen for Goliat), it can be observed that mainly due to the high
latitude location (150km to the north from Goliat), which accentuates the climatic
challenges, the concept chosen reduces the technical risk, the production downtime
and a potential emergency response (oil spill and/or rescue operations). For the
Snøhvit field, one of the main risks appears in the subsea multiphase transport
during 143km under low temperatures and harsh climatic conditions. In addition it
presents some different hazards due to the handling of LNG as compared to the
other two fields.
Summarizing, it can be observed from the resulting matrix, that the higher risk
activities identified for the different fields are related to:
i Johan Castberg: oil pipeline transport from the field to the terminal; tanker
operations especially under extreme weather conditions.
ii Snøhvit: multiphase pipeline transport from the field to the terminal.
iii Goliat: tanker operations in the proximity of the FPSO under harsh cli-
matic conditions, specifically the oﬄoading from the FPSO unit onto tankers;
offshore storage and processing of hydrocarbons.

Part IV
Conclusions
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Chapter13Concluding Remarks
The present thesis provides with an insight on a broad range of aspects influencing
offshore hydrocarbon field development in cold climate. Special emphasis has been
made on terminals as a major building block necessary in the development of a
petroleum field. Quantitative assessments of breakwater stability in cold climate
environments have been an important part of the discussions.
Moreover, three different development schemes in the Barents Sea: Johan
Castberg, Snøhvit and Goliat, have been used to carry out a practical case study
analysis, through which the knowledge gained during the first part of the thesis work
could be applied to different development solutions and terminal concepts in cold
climate. Furthermore, given the complex and unique risk challenges present in cold
climate regions, risk assessment arises as an important part of the decision making
process, and thus, has been used to understand the sensitivity of the different
development schemes.
i On offshore field development in cold climate:
– Cold climate oil and gas production, represents a potential contributor
for securing energy supply in the next 25 years, with key factors such as
an increased demand, technological progress and accesibility sharpening
the interest.
– Cold climate regions are complex risk environments, and therefore, any
hydrocarbon development in these areas, represents a balance between
opportunity and risk.
– The probability of an oil spill in cold climate is as in more temperate areas,
however, its consequences might be more severe, therefore, improved
mitigating measures are needed.
– Processing is a key part of a hydrocarbon development in order to obtain
products that can be transported, stored and marketed.
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– A terminal is a major building block necessary in the development of
a hydrocarbon field. High costs and weight and space restrictions of
offshore processing, make onshore terminals and important part of a
petroleum development.
ii On cold climate terminals:
– Recent developments in cold climate breakwater design, favour the use
of berm breakwaters. The Icelandic type berm breakwater, increases the
stability of the structure and decreases both overtopping and reflection
from the structure due to the use of several narrowly graded armour
classes.
– The analysis on the dependency of the armour size on wave height and
wave period for berm breakwaters, shows that usually, the stability
number (H0) is employed as stability criteria, however, doing so, only
the effect of the wave height is taken into account. If the period stability
number (H0T0) is used as mobility criteria, the effect of the wave period
is included in the calculation of the armour size.
– The accountability of the harbour resonance phenomena is of great
importance, specifically in the case of deepwater ports, which have been
shown to be more prone to harbour oscillation concerns.
– Offshore loading is the most vulnerable marine operation, particularly
under cold climate conditions. Thus, the oﬄoading option chosen should
ensure the ability to cope with the harsh environmental conditions at
the location.
iii On the case studies analysis:
– The location chosen for the Johan Castberg terminal at Veidnes, is well
protected and sheltered, presenting relatively mild wave conditions. A
berm breakwater, although in general recommended for cold climate
harbours, would probably not be the most economic solution in this
case. The required armour stone mass for a conventional rubble mound
breakwater, is relatively small, being therefore a more plausible solution
for this location.
– The results of the comparison of necessary armour unit masses for
different breakwater concepts, carried out for the terminal at Melkøya,
indicate that it would not have been possible to build a conventional
rubble mound breakwater, with a reasonable slope, from quarried stone
for the wave conditions at the site. Concrete armour units may have
been used, however, if good quality rock of the required size is available,
the berm breakwater concept would be the preferred option, as it was
the actual final design build at Melkøya.
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– The location of Johan Castberg, further north than Goliat or Snøhvit,
accentuates the challenges imposed due to climatic conditions, which
increase the technical and operational risks, specially offshore. The con-
cept chosen, avoids offshore storage and oﬄoading, therefore decreasing
the technical risks, the production downtime and potential emergency
response. The location of Goliat, further south, makes in that case
offshore processing, storage and oﬄoading a feasible and less expensive
solution.
– The results of the risk assessment carried out, show that Goliat presents
several hazardous situations related to offshore storage and oﬄoading
of hydrocarbons, specially if the northern location of the field and the
proximity to the coast are taken into account. Special procedures will be
implemented to reduce the risk during oﬄoading. Comparing the chosen
solution for Johan Castberg in terms of risks with an offshore processing
and oil storage solution, mainly due to the high latitude location, the
concept chosen reduces the technical and operational risks. For Snøhvit,
one of the main risks appears due to the subsea multiphase transport.
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AppendixABreakwater design: quantitativediscussion
This appendix presents the main design rules and formulations for berm and caisson
breakwaters. In addition, the extended calculations for the results of the quantitative
discussion carried out in Chapter 9 are presented here.
A.1 Berm Breakwaters
The main guidelines for the design of berm breakwaters can be found in the 2003
PIANC report State of the Art of Designing and Constructing Berm Breakwaters
[72]. The main formulations, design rules and generation of curves used in the main
body of the thesis are presented here.
A.1.1 Stability criteria
Several threshold criteria are defined to prevent the movement of rock. If the
hydraulic load exceeds the mobility threshold, instability of the armour layer occurs.
The most used parameters to evaluate the stability of the armour layer are a
combination of hydraulic and material parameters.
Stability number
H0 =
HS
∆D50
(A.1)
Period stability number
H0T0 =
HS
∆D50
√
g
D50
Tz (A.2)
where:
HS , significant wave height
A–0
APPENDIX A: BREAKWATER DESIGN QUANTITATIVE DISCUSSION A–1
∆ = ρsρw − 1
ρs, density of stone
ρw, density of water
D50 = (W50ρs )
1/3
W50, median stone weight
Tz, mean wave period
g, acceleration of gravity
A.1.2 Conceptual design rules for Icelandic-type breakwater
The design of an Icelandic berm breakwater involves the use of the non-reshaping
stability criteria and the use of several narrowly graded stone classes, the larger
armour classes placed at the most exposed locations.
The most common designs involve a non-reshaping statically stable structure
for the 100 years storm, which can be able, in addition, to withstand a wave height
with 1000 years return period without structural damage.
– Two layers of rocks are placed on the upper layer of the berm, and extend
down the slope to mean sea level.
– The larger armour class is calculated by: HS/∆D50 = 2, which corresponds
with the non-reshaping stability criteria.
– Recommended slopes below and above the berm are 1:1.5
– Berm width: 3.5HS
– Berm level: 0.65HS above design water level
– Crest height: RC/HSs1/3op
– The second class of armour stones is determined as: DN50II = 0.8D50I
A.1.3 Quantitative discussion: dependency of stone size on
wave height and period
The dependency of the armour size on wave height and wave period for berm
breakwaters has been assessed on Chapter 9. With this purpose, an Excel program
has been set up using the threshold criteria and parameters presented on Table 9.1.
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The use of the stability number (H0) or the period stability number (H0T0) as
mobility criteria, involve taking only the effect of the wave height into account or
wave height and period respectively.
Firstly, the stone weight for the larger armour class has been calculated as
a function of the significant wave height (HS) by using the stability number as
mobility criteria. The expression for the stability number (A.1), is derived taking
into account that the measure used for the stone dimension is D50 =
(
W50
ρs
)1/3
,
where D50 is an equivalent to the edge of a cube with the same mass as the stone
of mass W50.
H0 =
HS
∆D50
=⇒ D50 = HS∆H0 (A.3)
W50 = ρs
(
HS
∆H0
)3
(A.4)
where:
H0 =
{
2 for non-reshaping condition
2.7 for reshaping stable condition
This expression for the armour mass as a function of the significant wave height
has been plotted and is shown in Figure A.1 for both, non-reshaping and reshaping
static stable breakwaters.
Figure A.1: Stone size as a function of significant wave height by using H0 as
mobility criteria.
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In addition, the stone weight for the larger armour class has been also calculated
as a function of the significant wave height (HS) and the mean wave period (Tz).
For taking into account both effects, the period stability number has been used in
this case as mobility criteria. The expression for the period stability number (A.2),
is derived to obtain the stone mass as a function of wave height and period.
H0T0 =
HS
∆D50
√
g
D50
Tz =⇒ D50 =
(
HSTz
∆H0T0
)2/3
g1/3 (A.5)
taking again into account the measure for the stone dimension D50 =
(
W50
ρs
)1/3
,
W50 =
(
HSTz
∆H0T0
)2
gρs (A.6)
where:
H0T0 =
{
40 for non-reshaping condition
70 for reshaping stable condition
Figure A.2 shows the results of plotting this expression for both, the non-
reshaping and the reshaping static stable conditions.
Figure A.2: Stone size as a function of significant wave height and mean period
by using H0T0 as mobility criteria.
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In this case, three significant wave heights have been represented: HS = 8m,
HS = 10m and HS = 12m, for mean periods varying up to 25s.
For the calculations, gravity has been set to g = 9.81m/s2, water density
ρw = 1025kg/m3 and stone density ρs = 2700kg/m3. It is important to notice that
the density of the rock depends on the quarry available, and may influence the
stability criteria.
In both cases, it can be seen the large difference in the required weight size by
using the non-reshaping or the reshaping stability criteria. For instance, for a wave
height of HS = 8m, the Icelandic type breakwater would require a median stone of
approximately 40t. On the other hand, if the breakwater is designed as a reshaping
static stable breakwater, the larger armour needed would be of around 16t, half the
size needed for the non-reshaping type.
A.2 Caisson Breakwaters
The main guidelines for the design of caisson breakwaters can be found in the 2009
Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan (OCDI) report Technical
Standards and Commentaries for Port and Harbour Facilities in Japan. The main
formulations and design rules used in the main body of the thesis are presented
here.
A.2.1 Goda formulation for wave actions on a caisson
breakwater
The wave height used for the design, HD, is the highest wave height taken as
HD = 1.8HS , when the breaker is outside the surfzone. The wave period used to
calculate the wave length, is the significant period of the design wave, which is
equal to 0.9Tp or 1.2Tz, where Tp is the peak period and Tz is the mean period.
Figure A.3 shows the linear distribution of wave pressures acting on a caisson
type breakwater.
Elevation to which the wave pressure is exerted:
η∗ = 0.75(1 + cosβ)λ1HD (A.7)
where β is the angle between the wave approach and the line normal to the vertical
wall.
Pressure intensities:
p1 = 0.5(1 + cosβ)(α1λ1 + α2λ2cos2β)ρwgHD (A.8)
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Figure A.3: Wave pressure distribution on a caisson breakwater. Source: A.
Tørum, 2011
p3 = α3p1 (A.9)
p4 =
{
p1(1− hcη∗ ) : η∗ > hc
0 : η∗ ≤ hc
(A.10)
where λ1 and λ2 are pressure modification factors (1 is the standar value for
composite breakwaters); hc is the crest height of the vertical wall above SWL; g is
the acceleration of gravity; ρw is the water density. The coefficients α1, α2 and α3
are defined as follows:
α1 = 0.6 + 0.5
[
4pih/L
sinh(4pih/L)
]2
(A.11)
α2 = min
[(
hb − d
3hb
)(
HD
d
)2
; 2d
HD
]
(A.12)
α3 = 1− h
′
h
[
1− 1
cosh(2pih/L)
]
(A.13)
where h, h′ and d are the corresponding water depths shown in Figure A.1; hb
is the water depth at an offshore distance of 5 times the significant wave height;
and L is the wave length at water depth h.
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Uplift pressure:
pu = 0.5(1 + cosβ)α1α3λ3ρwgHD (A.14)
The Goda formula tends to overestimate the total wave loading by about 10%
[11]. It is important, thus, to take this uncertainty into account in probabilistic
design of caisson breakwaters. Moreover, if it is necessary to take into account
impulsive breaking wave pressures, the modificated formulation by Takahashi et al.
1994, needs to be used.
A.2.2 Quantitative discussion: dependency of maximum
horizontal force on wave height and period
The dependency of the maximum horizontal wave force against the vertical wall of
the caisson, on wave height and period, has been evaluated. An Excel program has
been set up using the Goda formulations, presented on the previous section, for the
calculation of forces. The total horizontal force on the caisson is calculated based
on the pressures intensities, for different wave heights and periods.
Figure A.4 shows the caisson configuration used here as an example, to carry
out the calculations.
Figure A.4: Example of caisson breakwater used for the analysis
Gravity has been set up to g = 9.81m/s2 and water density ρw = 1030kg/m3.
The design wave height (HD) has been varied from 8m to 18m. The maximum
horizontal force as a function of the wave height has been represented in this case
for peak periods varying from 13s to 19s. Figure A.5 shows an example of the
results obtained.
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Figure A.5: Maximum horizontal force on the vertical wall as a function of wave
height and period
AppendixBCase Studies: Breakwater Stability
This appendix presents the main formulations and detailed calculations carried out
for the comparison of armour unit masses presented in Chapter 11 for a potential
breakwater at Veidnes terminal, part of the Johan Castberg field; as well as the
assessment carried out for the Melkøya terminal, part of the Snøhvit field.
B.1 Formulations
The main formulations for the stability assessment of rubble mound breakwaters
using rocks or concrete units as armour layer are presented here. For the formulation
needed for berm breakwaters, reference is made to Appendix A, (A.1) and (A.2).
B.1.1 Hudson formulation, rock armour
Necessary median armour stone mass according to Hudson formula [73]:
W50 =
ρsH
3
KD
(
ρs
ρw
− 1
)3
cotgα
(B.1)
where:
W50, median stone weight
H = Hs, for slope angles 1.5 ≤ cotgα ≤ 3
ρs, density of stone
ρw, density of water
α, front slope angle of the breakwater
KD, coefficient obtained from model tests
B–0
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From the Coastal Engineering Manual [49], the coefficient KD can be obtained
from Figure B.1.
Figure B.1: KD values for H = Hs, slope angles 1.5 ≤ cotgα ≤ 3. Source: Coastal
Engineering Manual
B.1.2 Van der Meer formulation, rock armour
Necessary median armour stone mass according to Van der Meer formula [74]:
Plunging waves:
HS
∆D50
= 6.2CHP 0.18
(
S√
N
)0.2
ξ−0.5z (B.2)
Surging waves:
HS
∆D50
= 1.0CHP−0.13
(
S√
N
)0.2
ξPz
√
cotgα (B.3)
where:
D50 =
(
W50
ρs
)1/3
∆ = ρsρw − 1
CH = 1.4/(H1/20/H1/3), modification factor due to random wave breaking,
takes a value of 1 outside the surfzone.
ξz = tanα√ 2piHS
gT2z
, Iribarren number
Tz, mean wave period
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S = Ac/D250, damage level
N , number of waves
P , permeability coefficient
The permeability coefficient is taken as P = 0.4 for a cross section with armour
layer, filter and core, as in Figure B.2.
Figure B.2: Breakwater cross section for permeability coefficient P = 0.4. Source:
Van der Meer Consulting
B.1.3 Van der Meer formulation, concrete cubes
For concrete cubes in two layers on slope 1:1.5 to 1:1.2:
HS
∆D50
=
(
6.7N
0.4
od
N0.3
+ 1
)
s−0.1om (B.4)
where:
Nod = 0.5N , actual number of units displayed related to a width
N , number of waves
som = 2piHS/gT 2m, wave steepness
B.1.4 Van der Meer formulation, concrete tetrapodes
For concrete tetrapods in two layers on slope 1:1.5 to 1:1.2:
HS
∆D50
=
(
3.75
√
Nod√
N
+ 0.85
)
s−0.2om (B.5)
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B.2 Breakwater Stability Assessment: Veidnes Terminal
B.2.1 Meteocean parameters at Veidnes
Figure B.3 shows the preliminary meteocean parameters at Veidnes for 100 years
return period. This information is part of the screening studies for the terminal site
selection process for the Johan Castberg (Skrugard) field development, Courtesy of
Statoil.
The significant wave height is calculated using both wind and swell wave data
as follows:
H2s = H2s,wind +H2s,swell (B.6)
where Hs,wind = 2.2m and Hs,swell = 0.4m, are values taken from the meteocean
information shown in Figure B.3. The final value for the significant wave height to
be used in the calculations is thus Hs = 2.24m, after applying (B.6).
The mean period is calculated from the peak period which is provided for the
100 years return period in Figure B.3.
Tz = 1.3Tp (B.7)
where Tp = 6.2s, taken from the meteocean information shown in Figure B.1.
The final value for the mean wave period to be used in the calculations is, thus,
Tz = 8.06s, after applying (B.7).
B.2.2 Stability of armour layer for a rubble mound breakwater
concept
For the calculation of the necessary mass of individual armour units on a straight
slope, Hudson (B.1) and Van der Meer (B.2), (B.3) formulations have been used.
These formulations are the most used for conceptual design. For using them,
the wave direction is taken perpendicular to the longitudinal breakwater axis. A
deviation of the wave direction of, 10−20 ◦ from the normal, is considered to have a
minor effect on the breakwater stability [42]. It is assumed a two layer rock armour,
since single layer placement is more vulnerable to damage by removing only one
stone, therefore exposing the filter layer.
1. Hudson
From the Coastal Engineering Manual [49], the coefficient KD has been
taken as KD = 4 (see Figure B.1), for non-breaking waves, rough angular
stone shape and random placement; value corresponding to a percentage
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Figure B.3: Meteocean parameters at Veidnes. Return period 100 years. Source:
Courtesy of Statoil
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damage D = 0− 3%. The rest of the values for the calculations are taken as
H = Hs = 2.24m; ρs = 2700kg/m3; ρw = 1025kg/m3; slope 1:1.5.
The necessary armour stone mass by using Hudson formulation (B.1) is
therefore:
W50 = 1160kg ≈W50 = 1.2t (B.8)
The stone dimension D50 is considered equivalent to the edge of a cube with
the same mass as the stone of mass W50:
D50 =
(
W50
ρs
)1/3
=⇒ D50 ≈ 0.80m (B.9)
2. Van der Meer
The following values are taken for the calculations: Tz = 8.06s, from (B.7);
damage levels S = 2 and S = 6, which correspond to start of damage and
almost failure for a slope angle of cotα = 1.5; N = 3000, which corresponds
to approximately 9 hours sea state duration;
The necessary armour stone mass by using Van der Meer formulation (B.2),
(B.3) has been plotted in Figures B.4 and B.5 as a function of the Iribarren
number.
Figure B.4: Necessary armour stone mass vs Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 2; slope 1:1.5; permeability coefficient P = 0.4; non-breaking waves;
HS = 2.24m; N = 3000
The Iribarren number is the only parameter in which the wave period is
involved in Van der Meer formulation. Since Hudson formulation does not
take into account the wave period, the formulation gives results indifferent
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to the wave period or Iribarren number. Figure B.4 shows the results for a
damage level S = 2, which corresponds to start of damage. Figure B.5 has
been calcultated for a damage level S = 6, which represents almost the failure
situation for a slope cotα = 1.5.
Figure B.5: Necessary armour stone mass vs Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 6; slope 1:1.5; permeability coefficient P = 0.4; non-breaking waves;
HS = 2.24m; N = 3000
It can be observed that the change from plunging to surging occurs for an Irib-
arren number around ξz = 4.4. The mean wave period calculated, Tz = 8.06s,
corresponds therefore to the surging condition. However, there is always some
uncertainty on the determination of the mean wave period, and thus, a range
for the mean wave period can be defined between Tz = 6− 10s, which would
lead to Iribarren numbers between ξz = 3.4− 5.56, varying from plunging to
surging.
The calculations have been carried out only for rocks, since the results show
a relatively small stone size, which presumably would be easy to find in the
site. Thus, concrete armour units not being required.
B.2.3 Stability of armour layer for a berm breakwater concept
A berm breakwater concept as an alternative to the uniform slope has been also
calculated. The stability number and the period stability number have been used
for calculating the necessary armour stone mass.
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1. Stability Number
The use of the stability number (H0) as mobility criteria, involves taking only
the effect of the wave height into account. The expression of the armour stone
mass as a function of the significant wave height was derived in Appendix A.
The calculations for the main armour stone mass have been carried out for
the Icelandic type breakwater or non-reshaping (H0 = 2), and the reshaping
static stable type (H0 = 2.7)1.
W50 = ρs
(
HS
∆H0
)3
(B.10)
Table B.1 shows the results for the required maximum stone mass, by using
the stability number as mobility criteria.
Table B.1: Required maximum stone size for a berm breakwater concept at
Veidnes using stability number as mobility criteria; HS = 2.24m.
Category H0 W50 (kg)
Non-reshaping 2 870
Reshaping, static stable 2.7 350
2. Period Stability Number
The use of the period stability number (H0T0) as mobility criteria, includes
the effect of the wave period in addition to the wave height. The expression
of the armour stone mass as a function of the significant wave height and
period was derived in Appendix A. The calculations for the main armour
stone mass have been carried out for the Icelandic type breakwater or non-
reshaping and reshaping static stable types. The results obtained by using
the period stability number threshold criteria recommended by PIANC, show
large disagreement with the results obtained using the stability number. Thus,
the calculations have also been carried out following professor’s A. Tørum
recommendation for threshold criteria in non-reshaping berm breakwaters
[42].
W50 =
(
HSTz
∆H0T0
)2
gρs (B.11)
Table B.2 shows the results for the required maximum stone mass, by using
the stability number as mobility criteria.
1Threshold criteria defined by PIANC and shown in Table 11.1
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Table B.2: Required maximum stone size for a berm breakwater concept at
Veidnes using period stability number as mobility criteria; HS = 2.24m, Tz = 8.06s.
Category H0T0 W50 (kg)
Non-reshaping (PIANC guidelines) 40 2021
Non-reshaping (Prof. Tørum recommendation) 55 1069
Reshaping, static stable 70 660
Finally, comparing tables B.1 and B.2, the upper limits are selected as final
requirement for the maximum stone size in a berm breakwater concept for Veidnes.
However, for the non-reshaping case, the result obtained by using professor A.
Tørum threshold has been selected, since it provides a result closer to the one
obtained by using the stability number. This means that the threshold by PIANC
probably overpredicts the stone size. The results are shown in Table B.3.
Table B.3: Final requirement for maximum stone size for a berm breakwater
concept at Veidnes; HS = 2.24m, Tz = 8.06s.
Category W50 (tons) D50 (m)
Non-reshaping ≈ 1.1 0.75
Reshaping, static stable ≈ 0.70 0.65
B.3 Breakwater Stability Assessment: Melkøya Terminal
B.3.1 Meteocean parameters at Melkøya
The wave data2 for the 100 years return period at the Melkøya location correponds
with a significant wave height HS = 7.5m and a peak period Tp = 15.6s. Applying
equation (B.6) to calculate the mean wave period, the value obtained is Tz = 20.3s.
B.3.2 Stability of armour layer for a rubble mound breakwater
concept
For the necessary mass of individual armour units on a straight slope, Hudson (B.1)
and Van der Meer (B.2), (B.3) formulations have been used for the required rock
armour. In addition, the required concrete armour units have been calculated for
cubes and tetrapods assuming a two layer armour, and applying Van der Meer
formulas.
2Wave data retrieved from S. Sigurdarson et al., 2005 [61]
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1. Hudson
From the Coastal Engineering Manual [49], the coefficient KD has been
taken as KD = 4 (see Figure B.1), for non-breaking waves, rough angular
stone shape and random placement; value corresponding to a percentage
damage D = 0− 3%. The rest of the values for the calculations are taken as
H = Hs = 7.5m; ρs = 2700kg/m3; ρw = 1025kg/m3; slope 1:1.5.
The necessary armour stone mass by using Hudson formulation (B.1) is
therefore:
W50 ≈W50 = 44t (B.12)
The stone dimension D50 is considered equivalent to the edge of a cube with
the same mass as the stone of mass W50:
D50 =
(
W50
ρs
)1/3
=⇒ D50 ≈ 2.5m (B.13)
2. Van der Meer, rock armour
The following values are taken for the calculations: Tz = 20.3s, from (B.7) and
a peak period Tp = 15.6s; damage levels S = 2 and S = 6, which correspond to
start of damage and almost failure for a slope angle of cotα = 1.5; N = 3000,
which corresponds to approximately 9 hours sea state duration;
The necessary armour stone mass by using Van der Meer formulation (B.2),
(B.3) has been plotted in Figures B.6 and B.7 as a function of the Iribarren
number.
Figure B.6: Necessary armour stone mass vs Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 2; slope 1:1.5; permeability coefficient P = 0.4; non-breaking waves;
HS = 7.5m; N = 3000
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Figure B.7: Necessary armour stone mass vs Iribarren number for a damage
level S = 6; slope 1:1.5; permeability coefficient P = 0.4; non-breaking waves;
HS = 7.5m; N = 3000
For a mean wave period of Tz = 20.3s, the Iribarren number is ξz = 6.1. For
this Iribarren number the Van der Meer formula gives a required armour
stone mass W50 ≈ 83t, while the Hudson formula gives a required stone mass
W50 ≈ 44t.
3. Van der Meer, concrete cubes
After applying equation (B.4) for HS = 7.5; ρs = 2700kg/m3; N = 3000;
Nod = 0.5N = 0.2; wave steepness som = 0.012 for a mean wave period
Tz = 20.3s, the required mass of the armour unit using concrete cubes is:
W50 = ρs
(
HS
∆
(
6.7N
0.4
od
N0.3 + 1
)
s−0.1om
)3
=⇒W50 ≈ 30t (B.14)
4. Van der Meer, concrete tetrapodes
After applying equation (B.5) for HS = 7.5; ρs = 2700kg/m3; N = 3000;
Nod = 0.5N = 0.2; wave steepness som = 0.012 for a mean wave period
Tz = 20.3s, the required mass of the armour unit using concrete cubes is:
W50 = ρs
(
HS
∆
(
3.75
√
Nod√
N
+ 0.85
)
s−0.2om
)3
=⇒W50 ≈ 15t (B.15)
